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1.  W Kip Viscusi 
The Misspecified Agenda: The 1980s Reforms of 
Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation 
7.1 The Agenda for Regulatory Reform 
The 1970s marked the advent of  a new wave of regulation of health, safety, 
and the environment.' Congress created a series of new agencies with broad 
responsibilities, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety Com- 
mission (CPSC), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Although 
some of these agencies consolidated the functions previously dispersed among 
other smaller agencies, the sweeping legislative mandates given to these agen- 
cies marked a dramatic increase in the level of  regulation of  the American 
economy. Congress directed these agencies to promote health, safety, and envi- 
ronmental quality almost without compromise. 
Expectations were high. One of the principal authors of  OSHA's  enabling 
A variety of individuals read the draft manuscript and provided helpful comments, including 
Robert Crandall (Brookings), John F.  Morrall and Arthur Fraas (OMB), James Kallenborn and 
Frank Frodyma (OSHA), and Christopher Schroeder and Henry Grabowski (Duke).  Since none of 
these individuals shared all my views and some expressed specific disagreements, they should not 
be held responsible for any of my conclusions. 
1. For history of the development of these regulatory agencies, see the discussions in MacAvoy 
(1979) and Cornell, Noll, and Weingast (1976). 
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legislation predicted that the agency would cut workplace injuries in half.2 
Engineering studies of  traffic safety claimed automobile safety belts would 
dramatically reduce the carnage on the  highway^.^ 
This initial optimism was coupled with substantial resistance on the part of 
firms. These government regulations represented an intrusion into previously 
unregulated decisions. Enterprises no longer had the freedom to select the most 
profitable technology. Instead they had to meet often quite explicit guidelines 
regarding the character and performance of these technologies. To make mat- 
ters worse, there were also widespread suggestions that the regulations were 
ineffective in promoting their intended objectives. 
It quickly became clear that these efforts were quite costly and that their 
economic impacts had to be monitored. These concerns provided the impetus 
for establishing White House regulatory oversight efforts. 
The second general reaction to the new wave of regulation was that of dissat- 
isfaction. Supporters of regulation demanded greater achievements that were 
commensurate with these agencies’ responsibilities, and critics placed great 
emphasis on the low benefits relative to the dollars being expended. Regulatory 
reform for health, safety, and environmental regulation had become a promi- 
nent  political issue less than  one decade after the establishment of  these 
agencies. 
Although there was not unanimous agreement on the direction that these 
agencies should take, there were a number of central themes to these calls for 
ref0rn-1.~  Here I will review these guidelines for reform that emerged in the 
economic literature and policy debates of  the  1970s. These guidelines will 
serve as the reference point for assessing the regulatory reforms of the 1980s. 
First, economists recognized that there were often legitimate market failures 
that needed to be addressed. Environmental problems involve a classic case 
of externalities. Moreover, imperfect consumer and worker information may 
impede market provision of safety. Market forces involving risk are not, how- 
ever, completely absent. A series of studies in the  1970s documented labor 
market compensation for risk on the order of several hundred thousand dollars 
per statistical death for workers who had selected themselves into very high- 
risk jobs to as much as several million dollars per death for the more typical 
blue-collar worker (see Thaler and Rosen  1976; Smith 1976; and  Viscusi 
1979). Because of these constructive market forces, it is essential to ascertain 
that there is a legitimate market failure before determining that a regulation 
is warranted. 
The second general principle is that one should obtain an assessment of 
2. More specifically, Representative William Steiger predicted that  injuries would be reduced 
by  “50 percent or something like that.” See his statement in U.S.  Congress (1972, 274-78). See 
also Nichols and Zeckhauser (1981). 
3. For a description of the optimistic projections, see the discussion in Peltzman (1975). 
4. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the general principles that should guide regula- 
tory reform appears in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1988). 455  Health and Safety Regulation 
the costs and benefits of the regulatory policy. Initially, the concern was with 
regulatory costs. The steel and automobile industries, for example, were hit 
particularly hard. Since these basic industries were in decline and threatened 
by foreign competition, ensuring that excessive government regulation was not 
the causal factor in their demise became a prominent concern. 
Regulatory impacts should, however, be measured correctly. In assessing 
these costs and benefits, what matters is the value of the expected payoffs that 
will accrue to society. One should use the mean of the probability distribution 
rather than focusing on worst-case scenarios or, as many agencies do, the upper 
end of the 95 percent confidence interval for the risk level.5 
Although assessing the impacts of  policies is an essential prerequisite to 
sound policy choice, one must then utilize this information to select among 
policy alternatives.  The third regulatory principle is that policy choices should 
be cost effective. Available policy alternatives that can achieve the same bene- 
fits at less cost are preferable. Another example of  an inefficient regulatory 
alternative was the imposition of a requirement for a technological solution to 
air pollution problems by mandating the installation of  scrubbers, whereas a 
lower-cost method of achieving the same benefits by altering the type of coal 
used would have been sufficienL6 
A class of  regulatory options viewed as being superior to existing regula- 
tions on cost-effectiveness grounds is that of  performance-oriented alterna- 
tive~.~  Performance standards for the guarding of  machines, for example, 
would not only be less costly than OSHA specification standards but would 
also pertain to more types of machine designs, thus reducing machine guarding 
risks for a larger number of  workers. Similarly, use of  protective equipment 
to avert hearing loss resulting from excessive noise exposure would impose 
considerably lower compliance costs than changing the workplace environ- 
ment. Although there are legitimate debates regarding the feasibility of such 
performance-oriented  alternatives, owing to the difficulties  of monitoring com- 
pliance, the economic critics of regulatory agencies have urged these agencies 
at least to assess the merits of performance-oriented  alternatives. 
A fourth regulatory reform principle is that there should be an appropriate 
balancing of the benefits and costs of policies. Strict adherence to efficiency 
guidelines suggests that a benefit-cost test would be applicable, but the over- 
sight process did not formally adopt this criterion until the 1980s. Even where 
a precise calculation of benefits and costs is not feasible, agencies should con- 
5.  In  some instances, as in the case of EPA  policy, the conservatism bias may  be less scientifi- 
cally based since there is an  effort to ensure a “margin of safety” beyond the no-risk level. From 
an  economic standpoint, the aversion of society to incurring risks should be reflected in the valua- 
tion of the payoffs rather than a misrepresentation of the probabilities that influence these payoffs 
(see Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990; and Nichols and Zeckhauser 1986). 
6.  Lobbyists from the coal-producing areas likely to be most affected by a regulation permitting 
the choice of coal and focusing on the overall pollution level rather than on the means of attaining 
pollution control exerted substantial influence in determining this policy (see Crandall  1983). 
7. See, e.g., the discussions in MacAvoy (1977) and Viscusi (1983). 456  W. Kip Viscusi 
sider the overall merits of  the policy and pursue only those policies that they 
judge to be in society’s best interests. 
Although the degree to which economists adhere to strict compliance with 
a benefit-cost test varies, the importance of  addressing efficiency concerns is 
widely accepted as an important role for economists active in these policy de- 
bates.* As the Carter administration’s chairman of  the Council of  Economic 
Advisers, Charles L. Schultze, (1982,62), observed: 
For this reason, I strongly believe that economists in government have a 
particular role to play in the area of micro policy, not merely as disinterested 
purveyors of technical advice, but as advocates. I am not merely offering the 
pious statement that the economists ought to favor efficiency. What I am 
saying is that in matters of  specific micro policy, and within reasonable 
bounds, his role is to be the partisan advocate for efficiency even when the 
result is signi$cant  income losses for particular groups-which  it almost 
always is. 
Emphasis on the role of balancing of benefits and costs also leads to support 
for market-oriented alternatives. For example, one can achieve the efficient 
outcome with respect to environmental risks by  appropriate pricing of pollu- 
tion. Although there has been no effort to establish large-scale markets for 
pollution rights, under the Carter administration EPA introduced a number of 
innovative market-oriented  option^,^  such as the  bubble policy  introduced 
in  December 1979 (Federal Register 44 [ll December 19791: 71779). The 
bubble policy was introduced only on a very limited basis just before the turn 
of  the decade, but its originators hoped that this policy could be extended to 
enable firms to meet their pollution control objectives at less cost. 
Even if  these regulations were well designed, effective enforcement would 
be needed to ensure compliance. OSHA promulgated thousands of  standards 
for health and safety, but it coupled these detailed requirements with very weak 
enforcement. The prospect that a firm would see an OSHA inspector was re- 
mote, as these inspectors visited firms with roughly the same frequency as the 
passage of Halley’s comet. If  an inspector did arrive, the penalties assessed 
were very low. Greater financial penalties were needed if firms were to have 
the proper safety investment incentives. 
The final and perhaps most important theme that emerged was that there 
was a need for broad-based reform. The legislative mandates established by 
8. For example, some economists such as Lave (1981) indicate a variety of decision criteria that 
can be applied other than simply benefit-cost  analysis in its traditional form. However, even these 
modifications of the traditional benefit-cost framework provide for a greater degree of balancing 
than is achieved by the decisions of regulatory agencies. 
9. EPA  also introduced related efforts called netting and bunking. The netting policy begun in 
1976 enabled firms to achieve compliance  even though one part of the plant was being modernized, 
thus avoiding the entire plant being held to the  new source requirements. The banking policy 
enables firms to store their pollution rights if they are in compliance. See Crandall (1983) and, for 
a recent discussion of such policies, Hahn and No11 (1990). 457  Health and Safety Regulation 
Congress were overly restrictive and did not adequately recognize the eco- 
nomic trade-offs. All the enabling legislation for the risk and environmental 
agencies required that the agency promote the health or environmental objec- 
tive, but none required that there be an explicit balancing of  the costs and 
benefits of these efforts. Moreover, many of these pieces of legislation explic- 
itly prohibited such trade-offs. The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act is that the agency could not base its regu- 
lations on a formal benefit-cost test. Moreover, the Clean Air Act even more 
explicitly  prohibits the consideration of  costs of any kind in setting ambient 
air quality standards, much less utilizing benefit-cost analysis. 
By  far the most important need was for fundamental legislative reform to 
incorporate the opportunity for such balancing of  cost and benefit considera- 
tions in the design of regulatory policy. Such changes are fundamental to any 
reform effort since the legislative mandates will limit the degree to which regu- 
latory oversight activities will be able to influence the policies of the regulatory 
agencies. Short-term efforts to alter regulatory policies by slowing the pace of 
regulation or altering the enforcement effort will not yield long-run changes 
in the regulatory approach. Ultimately, the agency’s enabling legislation will 
determine the shape of these policies. 
A major failure of the Reagan regulatory reform effort is not just that such 
reforms were never achieved but that they were never even attempted. The 
legislative energies of the Reagan administration were devoted to tax reform 
rather than rewriting the legislative mandates of regulatory agencies. Although 
regulatory reform was one of the four key pillars of the Reagan economic pro- 
gram, it was generally viewed as meriting the lowest priority of the four major 
areas of concern. As a result, the reform measures that were introduced would 
necessarily have a short-term impact. Indeed, the deregulation effort did not 
even last through the first Reagan term. 
My analysis begins with a discussion of the changes in institutional struc- 
ture, notably the budgetary and staffing allocations of the regulatory agencies 
and the strengthening of the regulatory oversight mechanism. I then turn to the 
performance of the regulatory reform effort in altering the structure of regula- 
tion, promoting the balancing of benefits and costs, revamping existing regula- 
tions, and modifying the structure of new regulatory initiatives. I then examine 
changes in regulatory enforcement policy and the overall impact of  health, 
safety, and environmental regulation in the 1980s. 
The principal theme of this assessment is that there were two quite distinc- 
tive regulatory agendas during the two Reagan administrations. The first pe- 
riod, which covered most of  the first Reagan term, was one of  deregulation. 
There were a number of constructive changes, including the strengthening of 
the regulatory oversight mechanism, an improvement in the balancing of costs 
and benefits of  regulatory policies, and selected new  regulatory initiatives. 
These reform efforts failed to achieve their full potential because of the ab- 458  W.  Kip Viscusi 
sence of fundamental legislative reform and, more generally, the absence of 
meaningful regulatory reform as contrasted with regulatory relief. 
After the enthusiasm for the initial deregulation agenda waned, the regula- 
tory approach came to resemble that of the pre-Reagan era. The pace of regula- 
tion and the implementation of  these regulations became more vigorous, and 
there was little evidence that the character of the regulatory policies had under- 
gone much more than a temporary interruption during the short-lived period 
of deregulation. The opportunity for sound regulatory reform through an ap- 
propriately specified reform agenda had been missed. 
7.2  Budgetary and Staffing Trends 
7.2.1  The Rationale for Cutbacks 
For the usual economic process in which there are diminishing marginal 
benefits and rising marginal costs, economists would recommend a decrease 
in  such  activities once the  incremental burdens  exceed the benefits. This 
maxim also applies to regulatory policy if scaling back the degree of regulation 
will eliminate regulations whose net effects are adverse. 
Straightforward application of this principle assumes that the policy mix is 
efficient. If we are not on the efficient frontier, then the main reform that is 
needed is to alter the character of the regulation. Although some regulations 
were excessively stringent, there is little evidence that the number and scope 
of safety and environmental  regulations promulgated was too great. In contrast, 
for rate and  entry regulation, there was a widespread consensus that regulatory 
restrictions of all kinds were unnecessary, as they impeded the efficient opera- 
tion of markets. In these contexts, sound regulatory reform was synonymous 
with deregulation. Unfortunately, deregulation is not an appropriate objective 
for all classes of regulatory activity. 
The need for better risk regulation rather than deregulation was also stressed 
by  leading economists in  Reagan’s  regulatory reform effort. Shortly after 
Reagan’s election, the future chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
Murray Weidenbaum (1980, 15), observed: “In the case of the newer social 
regulation, which typically attempts to correct imperfections in the market (so- 
called externalities, meaning the costs imposed by one segment of the econ- 
omy on another), the approach should be to seek out the most effective and the 
least burdensome methods of achieving the desired objectives.” 
The distinctions made by other administration spokesmen were less refined. 
Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman called for a “sub- 
stantial rescission of the regulatory burden,” with a need for a major “regula- 
tory ventilation” to assist American business.’O President Reagan subsequently 
10. Stockman’s comments are based on his December 1980 memorandum “Avoiding  a GOP 
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established the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief headed by Vice- 
President Bush, with a notable emphasis on relief rather than reform. In re- 
flecting on the regulatory achievements of the Reagan administration, Presi- 
dent Reagan observed, 
Over the last 7 1/2 years, we have substantially reduced that burden, cutting 
red tape and slowing the pace of new regulation. 
When I became President in 1981, I directed that Federal agencies, within 
the scope afforded by law, should reduce the excess burden of government 
regulation that is borne by every worker, consumer, business, and state and 
local government in this Nation. Under the guidance of the Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, Federal agencies have eliminated unnecessary 
regulatory costs ranging in the tens of billions of dollars." 
Achieving a balance between regulatory costs and risk reductions had be- 
come a subsidiary concern. Deregulation had become the fundamental policy 
objective during the initial years of the Reagan administration. 
7.2.2  Shifts in Budgets and Staffing 
One mechanism for scaling back the role of government regulation is to cut 
back on an agency's budget and staff. In the extreme case, one could eliminate 
an agency altogether. 
A prominent target for elimination was the Consumer Product Safety Com- 
mission. This small-scale product safety agency had a disappointing perfor- 
mance record from the standpoint of both supporters and opponents of  the 
overall function of  the agency. Short of abolition, another possibility was to 
move this independent commission into the executive branch by making it an 
agency under an existing cabinet member, thus increasing the potential for 
executive oversight. Although there were suggestions that such options were 
under consideration, no serious efforts were made to achieve a restructuring. 
The policy option chosen instead was to cut back on the agency's activities. 
From 1980 to 1989, the CPSC budget dropped by one-fourth (table 7.1), and 
its staffing declined by over 40 percent. 
These extreme cutbacks are not the only instance of  increasing budgetary 
stringency. In terms of staffing, the summary statistics at the bottom of table 
7.2 indicate that there was an overall drop of personnel in all the risk agencies 
listed in this table. The fringe advisory groups-the  Council on Environmental 
Quality and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission-expe- 
rienced particularly dramatic declines in their staff. 
For most agencies, the general pattern from 1980 to 1985 was one of fairly 
stable nominal budgets but declining personnel. From 1985 to 1989, there was 
a stabilization and in some cases an expansion of the regulatory agencies. The 
case of OSHA is particularly noteworthy. OSHA's staff in 1980 was almost one 
11. See the statement by Ronald Reagan in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1988, 
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Table 7.1  Budgetary Trends for Principal Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Agencies 
Obligations ($millions) by Fiscal Year 
1975  1980  1985  1989 
~  ~~ 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Council on Environmental Quality 
Occupational Safety and Health Adm. (DOL) 
Mine Safety and Health Adm. (DOL) 
Food and Drug Adm. (HHS) 
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Adm. (DOT) 
Federal Aviation Adm. (DOT) 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
National Transportation Safety Board 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (DOA) 


















































Total  1,669  3,298  4,058  5,750 
Source; Warren and Chilton (1990, table A- 1). Agency selection and totals calculated by the author. 
Note:  DOL = Department of Labor; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; DOT = 
Department of Transportation; DOA = Department of Agriculture. 
Table 7.2  Staf6ng Trends for Principal Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Agencies 
Permanent Full-Time Positions by 
Fiscal Year 
1975  1980  1985  1989 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Council on Environmental Quality 
Occupational Safety and Health Adm. (DOL) 
Mine Safety and Health Adm. (DOL) 
Food and Drug Adm. (HHS) 
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Adm. (DOT) 
Federal Aviation Adm. (DOT) 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
National Transportation Safety Board 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (DOA) 



















































34,070  51,182  47,206  45,715 
Source:  Warren and Chilton  (1990, table A-2). Agency  selection  and totals calculated  by  the 
author. 
Note: See table 7.1. 461  Health and Safety Regulation 
and a half times greater than it was in 1985. These cutbacks primarily affected 
the OSHA inspection personnel, as there was a dramatic decrease in the OSHA 
enforcement staff. By decreasing the enforcement effort, the government could 
reduce the burden on business imposed by government regulation. Decreasing 
the enforcement stringency did not, however, address the long-term reform 
need, which was a restructuring of the standards that would be enforced. The 
extent of the decreased inspection effort may not have been of major conse- 
quence, however, since the probability of inspection was already quite low and 
did not change much in the early 1980s. By 1989, the OSHA staff and budget 
had  increased substantially from its  1985 level, but in terms of  personnel 
OSHA remained below its level in 1980. 
The principal exception to these adverse trends was EPA. Although there 
were cutbacks at EPA  during the Gorsuch era, these cuts were quickly re- 
versed. Because of the increased responsibilities of EPA over an increasingly 
broad range of hazards including unconventional pollutants, such as hazardous 
wastes and toxic substances, both the budget and the number of personnel of 
this agency rose considerably in the 1980s. Indeed, the total EPA budget in 
1989 was more than double its 1980 level. 
Altering budgetary allotments and personnel in the manner indicated in 
tables 7.1 and 7.2 is much easier to achieve than a fundamental shift in the 
character of policy. Overhauling an agency’s regulatory structure is a daunting 
task, as the performance record considered below will indicate. However, re- 
ducing an agency’s expenditures and staffing within the context of  broadly 
based cutbacks in taxes and government programs simultaneously achieves 
regulatory relief as well as economic savings. 
In some cases, the loss in safety from these cutbacks was not great. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, for example, plays only 
a minor advisory role. Moreover, the overall emphasis of  the cutbacks was 
correct. EPA  merited the greatest increases since it had the fastest-growing 
regulatory agenda. New classes of  environmental risks emerged to augment 
the traditional concerns of the agency with air pollution, water pollution, and 
pesticides as well as the increased concern with long-term hazards such as acid 
rain and global warming. Although the overall cutback strategy appears to have 
been ill chosen, the realignment of the relative degrees of responsibility among 
these agencies appears to have been correct. 
7.3  The Regulatory Oversight Process 
Although appointments to regulatory agencies are an important mechanism 
for influencing policy, the incentives of the agencies’ career staff and the pres- 
sures exerted by the traditional constituencies lead to the need for some form 
of executive branch oversight. Unlike legislative initiatives, regulations do not 
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the agency generally has broad leeway subject to its legislative mandate and 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
7.3.1  Regulatory Oversight in Previous Administrations 
To address the costs imposed by  regulations, President Nixon introduced 
informal quality of life reviews. This framework took on more structure within 
the Ford administration, as President Ford established a formal oversight pro- 
cess whereby regulatory agencies were required to prepare an inflationary im- 
pact statement assessing the effect of major regulations on productivity and 
costs (Executive Order 11821, 24 November 1974). In addition, the Ford ad- 
ministration established the Council on Wage and Price Stability in 1974 to 
oversee this oversight effort. The Council’s legislation enabled it to “intervene 
and otherwise participate on its own behalf in rulemaking, ratemaking, licens- 
ing, and other proceedings before any of the departments and agencies of the 
United States, in order to present its views as to the inflationary impact that 
might result from the possible outcomes of  such proceedings.” The agency’s 
authority was advisory in nature, and it covered independent and executive 
branch regulatory agencies. 
President Carter bolstered the structure of this review process by requiring 
that regulatory analyses show that “alternative approaches have been consid- 
ered and the least burdensome of the acceptable  alternatives  have been chosen” 
(Executive Order 12044, 24 March 1978). This requirement was tantamount 
to a cost-effectiveness  test. The Council on Wage and Price Stability remained 
the main oversight group responsible for overseeing this effort. Carter also 
established a  Regulatory Council to  track agencies’ upcoming regulatory 
agenda in its regulatory calendar. These activities were supplemented by a new 
body within the executive office of  the president-the  Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group (RARG). RARG consisted of representatives from the Council 
of Economic Advisers, various branches of the White House (domestic policy 
staff, Council on Wage and Price Stability, and Office of  Management and 
Budget), and various executive branch agencies that served on a rotating basis. 
This interagency group prepared assessments of selected major regulatory ac- 
tivities that were then filed in the rule-making proceedings by the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability. These advisory efforts laid the substantive ground- 
work for lobbying by  leading White House officials-the  chairman of  the 
Council of  Economic Advisers and  the inflation advisor to the president, 
Alfred E. Kahn. 
Although these advisory efforts sometimes influenced the structure of regu- 
lations and, perhaps more important, educated the regulatory agencies con- 
cerning the appropriate perspective they should take in assessing prospective 
regulations, there  was  general  agreement that  the  process  needed  to  be 
strengthened. So long as the oversight activities remained advisory in nature, 
their ultimate impact would be modest. Second, the economic tests applied to 463  Health and Safety Regulation 
new regulations did not require that agencies strike any balance between the 
benefits and the costs of regulations, only that they attempt to achieve a particu- 
lar objective as cheaply as possible, however ill chosen that objective  might be. 
7.3.2  Reagan’s Oversight Process 
The Reagan administration quickly restructured the oversight process. First, 
it abolished the Council on Wage and Price Stability so as to eliminate the 
wage and price standards role of the council that had emerged during the Carter 
administration. The council’s regulatory oversight staff then moved to the Of- 
fice of Management and Budget. From an institutional standpoint, this change 
enhanced the leverage that the regulatory oversight process could exert since it 
was more closely involved with budgetary and staffing decisions. The only 
disadvantage is that the abolition of the council also eliminated the legislative 
authority to intervene in the rule-making proceedings of independent agencies, 
such as the FTC and CPSC. 
The leading economic participants in the development of the initial over- 
sight effort were CEA Chairman Murray Weidenbaum and James C. Miller 111, 
the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Miller was an experienced 
regulatory reformer, having served as an official at the Council on Wage and 
Price Stability during the Ford administration.12  The day after his inauguration, 
President Reagan established the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief 
chaired by Vice President Bush, with Miller serving as the executive director. 
Shortly thereafter, on 17 February 198 1, President Reagan promulgated Execu- 
tive Order 12291, which established the major ingredients of the new regula- 
tory oversight structure. 
This executive order instituted two major changes. First, agencies were re- 
quired to show that the benefits of regulations exceeded their costs and that 
they had chosen the policy option that maximized the net benefits to society. 
Although agencies were exempted from this requirement when it violated their 
legislative mandate, even in these situations the agency was required to assess, 
but not necessarily compare, benefits and costs. Unfortunately, the exemption 
pertaining to conflicts with legislative mandates is the central provision, not a 
minor nuance. Since all health, safety, and environmental agencies are gov- 
erned by  restrictive legislative mandates that limit benefit-cost trade-offs, in 
practice OMB cannot require that these regulations satisfy a benefit-cost test. 
The second component of  Executive Order 12291 is that approval by  the 
regulatory oversight group was no longer an advisory process. The agency was 
required to submit the proposal to OMB for approval before it could move 
forward. It could appeal any adverse decision to the President’s Task Force on 
12. For a selection of the regulatory analyses prepared by President Ford’s oversight group, see 
Miller and Yandle (1979). 464  W. Kip Viscusi 
Regulatory Relief. This executive order continues to be regarded as “the back- 
bone of executive regulatory oversight activities” (see U.S. Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget 1988,13-14). 
The oversight process also added an earlier review procedure through the 
institution of regulatory planning provisions in  1985.13  President Reagan is- 
sued Executive Order 12498, which required regulatory agencies to submit 
to OMB a draft regulatory program, thus expanding the regulatory calendar 
concept  of  the  Carter  administration. Oversight activities address  regula- 
tions in their final stages. By that point, the agencies have already established 
a  major commitment  to  a  regulatory  policy,  making their positions  diffi- 
cult to alter. Moreover, agencies have also generated substantial political sup- 
port for regulations soon to be issued, limiting the ability of  OMB  to  al- 
ter  the  regulatory  structure. By  influencing the  regulatory program  of  an 
agency at an earlier stage, OMB could better alter the direction of regulatory 
policy. 
A controversial component of the regulatory oversight agenda was the prin- 
ciple of federalism: “Federal regulation should not preempt state laws or regu- 
lations, except to guarantee rights of national citizenship or to avoid significant 
burdens on interstate commerce” (U.S. Office of  Management and Budget 
1988, 20). The economic rationale is that the costs and benefits of regulations 
may differ by area and that regulations should reflect this heterogeneity. 
Rigid application of this approach, however, ignores some of the benefits of 
uniform national standards. If firms must invest in technologies to comply with 
a variety of different regulations, regulatory compliance costs may escalate. 
One such situation is with respect to hazard warnings. Uniform national 
standards are desirable since they provide individuals with a common warnings 
vocabulary. Right-to-know movements with differing requirements have, how- 
ever, proliferated at the local level. A chief example is California Proposition 
65, passed in  1986, which requires firms selling products that pose risks of 
cancer or birth defects (e.g., wine manufacturers) or that expose their workers 
or customers to carcinogens (e.g., gas stations) to provide appropriate warn- 
ings. Beginning in 1986, the food industry sought federal preemption of these 
local warning efforts, urging the FDA to adopt a uniform national warning 
standard. The worst-case outcome for industry involves packaging foods with 
different warnings for different states. Application of the federalism principles 
suggested that there is no reason for the government to intervene, and the gov- 
ernment did not. Although the national government should not attempt to es- 
tablish uniform national regulations that adopt unattractive state regulations on 
a broader scale, national uniformity may benefit firms through reduced compli- 
ance costs. 
13. This was undertaken under Executive Order 12498.4 January  1985. 465  Health and Safety Regulation 
7.3.3  The Regulatory Budget Alternative 
Although the Reagan oversight mechanism included many of the ingredients 
needed to make oversight more effective, it did not undertake the radical trans- 
formation of the oversight process that some individuals had advocated. There 
had been several proposals in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the govern- 
ment establish a regulatory budget, not unlike its budget for actual alloca- 
tion~.'~  In its simplest version, the regulatory budget concept involves OMB 
establishing a budgetary limit for each regulatory agency, where this budget 
pertains to the total cost that these regulations can impose on society. Imposing 
such limits clearly would provide regulatory discipline. 
There are, however, several factors that limit the attractiveness and feasibil- 
ity of this proposal. First, the regulatory budget proposal is responsive to the 
regulatory relief objective, but it does not directly alter the character of regula- 
tions. Second, whereas budgets for agencies have an automatic validating pro- 
cess in that an agency will know at the end of the year whether it has exceeded 
the budget, there is no such internal check for a regulatory budget. Agencies 
must rely on cost estimates that may not accurately reflect the actual impacts. 
In some cases, even calculating costs will be a substantial object of  contro- 
versy. What, for example, is the cost of affirmative action requirements? 
Finally, establishing a regulatory budget requires that an agency know in 
advance what the appropriate budgetary levels should be. Moreover, that calcu- 
lation requires a detailed assessment of the benefits and costs of regulations. 
For prospective regulations, benefits and costs can be assessed most easily 
within the context of  the type of  oversight mechanism that OMB adopted. 
Since an agency would always wish to pursue an effort with a positive benefit- 
cost balance irrespective of previous budgetary decisions, there seems then to 
be no rationale for proceeding on other than a piecemeal basis for new regula- 
tions. If existing regulations were to count with respect to the budget, difficult 
problems arise with respect to establishing the cost of regulations promulgated 
many years earlier. Moreover, achieving changes in existing regulatory policies 
for which many firms have already invested billions of dollars in compliance 
expenditures will create substantial political opposition. One cannot simply 
replace a regulation from the 1970s with an unfavorable benefit-cost balance 
by a new regulation with a more favorable benefit-cost balance. The substantial 
vested interests in the earlier regulatory regime will resist such changes. 
Overall, the regulatory budget does not appear to be compelling conceptu- 
ally, and, more important, it would impose a degree of discipline on the regula- 
tory agencies that would far exceed what could be achieved. In practice, OMB 
encountered substantial opposition in promoting a benefit-cost requirement for 
14. For advocacy of  this budget concept, see DeMuth  (1980a,  1980b, 1984) and Litan  and 
Nordhaus  (1983). In Viscusi (1983), I provide a detailed critique of  the regulatory budget ap- 
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new regulatory policies. Implementing an overall regulatory budget concept 
would have required much more political support than the oversight group had. 
7.3.4 
An assessment of the overall performance of the regulatory oversight pro- 
cess cannot be divorced from an evaluation of substantive changes in regula- 
tory policy, which is the subject of  the subsequent sections. However, it is 
useful to highlight a few of the most distinctive aspects of this process. 
First, the change in the oversight test to include a benefit-cost requirement 
was consistent with most reform agendas. The regulatory analysis filings dur- 
ing the Ford and Carter administrations often advocated such balancing even 
though the executive orders empowering these efforts did not require a benefit- 
cost test. 
The benefit-cost analysis requirement often led to exemplary studies of this 
type. A prominent example of a well-executed benefit-cost assessment is the 
Department of Transportation’s analysis of the merits of center-high-mounted 
stop-lamps,  which analyzed the comparative  efficacy of different types of stop- 
lamps in reducing collision damage and compared these reduced damage sav- 
ings with the lamps’ costs. EPA’s assessment of the gasoline lead phase-down 
rule similarly was accompanied by an excellent regulatory analysis, as was the 
analysis of the construction fall protection standard carried out by  OSHA.I5 
These improvements in the quality of regulatory analyses represented a sub- 
stantial advance from earlier years. 
What is less clear is that the extent to which these improved analyses altered 
the policy choices or simply verified the good choices being made. Although 
many of the benefit-cost analyses carried out by  the agencies were of  high 
quality, it would be naive to assume that regulatory policies in the 1980s were 
dictated by strict adherence to a benefit-cost test. 
The second major advance of the Reagan regulatory oversight process was 
the increased leverage given to the oversight effort. The requirement that the 
agency submit the regulatory proposal to OMB for prior approval gave the 
oversight group more binding authority than it had had in the past. Indeed, 
many supporters of the efforts of regulatory agencies feared that OMB would 
now dictate regulatory policy. The substantially increased authority of the reg- 
ulatory oversight process was noted by James C. Miller 111, whom the press 
designated the “regulatory czar”: “If you  are the toughest kid on the block, 
most kids won’t pick a fight with you. The Executive Order establishes things 
quite clearly” (“Deregulation HQ’ 198 1, 19). 
After the initial wave of regulatory reform efforts, the political support for 
deregulation began to wane. This shift was reflected in Vice President Bush’s 
Performance of the Reagan Oversight Effort 
15. For a review of these analyses, see the  Office of Management  and Budget (1988, esp. 
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decision to abolish the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief in August 
1983. Agencies also began to challenge this authority. 
The extent of  the decreased impetus for regulatory reform is reflected in 
several events. During the debate over the 1986  reauthorization  of the oversight 
group, Representative Dingell led an effort to eliminate the OIRA group. The 
compromise ultimately reached provided for more disclosures of  OMB’s re- 
view efforts. 
A  1986 court decision (Environmental Defense  Fund v.  Lee  Thomas) re- 
quired that OMB not delay rule makings if the agency faced a statutory dead- 
line. EPA  subsequently used this ruling to curtail OMB’s review ability by 
delaying proposals until near the legislative deadline. Whereas the deadline 
was reached only once before 1986, after the court decision EPA ran up against 
the constraint six to seven times per year. Labor unions have also adopted this 
strategy on behalf of OSHA, as they have obtained court orders to force regula- 
tion of formaldehyde, ethylene oxide, asbestos, and lead. The courts required 
that OSHA examine these issues, not that it necessarily issue regulations. The 
OSHA health standards staff, however, used these orders to push for stringent 
regulations. 
Finally, Representative Dingell wrote a letter to Lee Thomas in  1987 ex- 
pressing concern with respect to OMB review before EPA had made its regula- 
tory decision. This congressional concern has also been utilized by  EPA to 
curtail the role of OMB. 
The result has been a substantial expansion of regulatory activity. Whereas 
EPA proposed an average of three to five major rules in the early 1980s, under 
Lee Thomas EPA’s  major rules proposals averaged twenty per year. The de- 
crease in the regulatory initiatives in the early 1980s proved to be only tempo- 
rary, as OMB had little ability to alter the structure of this expanded regulatory 
regime in a fundamental way.  By the end of the 1980s, the OMB oversight 
group was no longer Miller’s “biggest kid on the block.” Instead, it was influ- 
ential only on the margin. 
The success of the components of the OMB effort had also differed. The 
basic Executive Order 12291  providing for benefit-cost analyses and establish- 
ing the character of regulatory reviews has proved to be most consequential. 
The subsequent Executive Order 12498 requiring OMB review of the regula- 
tory agendas has proved less successful. The thumbnail sketches of regulatory 
options being considered provide OMB with some indication of future regula- 
tory policies, but these projected agendas have been sufficiently fragmentary, 
and OMB’s leverage has been sufficiently weak that there has been little influ- 
ence on the future direction of regulatory policies. 
Although the strengthening of the regulatory oversight process represents a 
prominent but limited achievement, the transformation in the character of the 
oversight mechanism also has deficiencies. Whereas regulatory oversight in 
earlier administrations entailed comprehensive analyses of  regulations that 
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review is an internal procedure. In situations in which oversight officials do 
not have  to compile comprehensive analyses and make public the results of 
these analyses, the oversight mechanism may not serve as an advocate of  the 
most  attractive option  from  an  economic  standpoint. Moreover, until  the 
benefit-cost assessment is undertaken, the optimal regulatory alternative may 
not be clear. The danger of mistaken decisions is particularly great when lead- 
ing political actors in the White House believe that they know the answer in 
advance and do not feel the need to be guided by  a precise analysis of  the 
merits of the regulatory option. 
The absence of  a more public regulatory debate has other possible draw- 
backs as well. Although the secretive nature of the negotiation process with 
agencies has advantages in terms of enabling parties to modify their stance 
without incurring the costs of altering their positions in a public confrontation, 
disclosure of OMB’s reasoning would foster public understanding and provide 
guidance to other agencies regarding proper criteria for policy design. In many 
situations, OMB was attacked, perhaps needlessly, for delaying regulations or 
blocking regulations. 
OMB’s record in reforming regulation suggests that, in most cases, the re- 
view process has little effect on the regulation (see table 7.3). Almost three- 
fourths of  all regulations in 1987 were approved by OMB in their initial form, 
and almost one-quarter were approved after revision. Only 3 percent of  the 
proposals were rejected. In the absence of a public record of  the manner in 
which the proposals were altered either in anticipation of the review or as part 
of the review, a more precise assessment of the impact of oversight is not pos- 
sible. 
7.4  Establishing an Appropriate Price for Risk 
7.4.1  Agency Practices in Establishing Risk-Dollar Trade-offs 
The essential ingredient of benefit-cost trade-offs in the context of risk and 
environmental regulations is to establish the risk-dollar trade-off. Before the 
Reagan administration, agencies erred in two competing directions. First, in 
monetizing the benefits of  health risks, agencies typically assessed the lost 
earnings and medical costs associated with the risk. Some agencies, such as 
the CPSC, had more detailed injury cost models, but these were not based on 
individuals’ willingness to pay for risk reduction. Nonpecuniary health im- 
pacts and, more generally, society’s willingness to pay to avoid small risks were 
not recognized. 
An opposite bias is that the legislative mandates of the risk regulation agen- 
cies were absolute in character. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to set ambient 
air quality standards independent of  cost considerations. In other instances, 
trade-offs are possible, but these trade-offs must fall short of  a full-blown 
benefit-cost test. Agencies such as OSHA and EPA consequently focused on 469  Health and Safety Regulation 
Table 7.3  Nature of Regulatory Oversight Actions, 1987 
USDA  EPA  DOT  DOL  AllAgencies  %ofTotal 
Total reviews 
Consistent without change 
Consistent with change 
Withdrawn by agency 
Returned for consideration 
Returned sent improperly 
Emergency 

















































Source:  U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1988,552). 
Note: See table 7.1. 
affordability. Indeed, OSHA’s  legislative mandate requires that it follow this 
approach. The general consensus is that the net effect of these biases led most 
risk regulation agencies to err on the side of excessive stringency, judged from 
the standpoint of economic efficiency. 
The obvious solution is to rewrite the legislative mandates of these agencies. 
Ultimately, no meaningful regulatory reform can be achieved without some 
explicit attempt to balance the competing effects of regulation. Because legis- 
lative reform was not undertaken to achieve this end, the regulatory reform 
efforts could have only a modest and short-term impact. 
7.4.2  Valuing Life: The Hazard Communication Debate 
Perhaps the most noteworthy change in the nature of  the regulatory debate 
is that the appropriate government expenditure per statistical life saved became 
an explicit object of concern. In earlier administrations, the regulatory over- 
sight staff raised issues dealing with the value of life, with the principal reac- 
tion of agency economists being that such calculations were politically infeas- 
ible. Since lives were too sacred to value, agencies calculated the “costs of 
death.” These costs consisted of the present value of the lost earnings and med- 
ical expenses. Although this concept may be appropriate from a tort liability 
compensation perspective, it abstracts from the value that individuals place on 
their welfare above and beyond their financial well-being. Moreover, it neglects 
the fact that attitudes toward risk-dollar trade-offs involving small probabilities 
may entail quite different terms of trade than if one were faced with the pros- 
pect of certain death. In this as in other policy contexts, the appropriate benefits 
value is society’s willingness to pay for the risk reduction. 
Agencies ultimately adopted the value of life approach, but not because of 
its compelling intellectual foundation. In the 1980s, OSHA undertook a regu- 
latory analysis for its hazard communication standard, which would have re- 
quired labeling and other forms of risk communication for all risky chemicals 
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exceeded the costs. Armed with this favorable result, OSHA submitted the 
regulation to OMB for approval. OMB correctly observed that the risk effects 
had been misassessed by  OSHA, leading to a substantial upward bias in the 
benefits. OMB concluded that a more accurate assessment implied that costs 
exceeded benefits. After OMB rejected the regulation in 1982,  OSHA appealed 
its case to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 
To  see how  value of  life considerations entered this debate, consider the 
statistics in the summary table 7.4. All figures in this table have  been dis- 
counted to reflect the appropriate time lags involved for diseases such as cancer 
that have long latency periods. Although the hazard communication  regulation 
would affect lives, it would also affect other health impacts, chiefly nonfatal 
job injuries and disabilities.  At the time of the analysis, statistics  were available 
on the implicit dollar value that workers attached to nonfatal injuries and fatali- 
ties, but there were no comparable values for disabling injuries. The approach 
that I used was to assess the sensitivity of the results, taking as fixed the esti- 
mated trade-off between fatalities and lost workday injuries (estimated to be 
at a ratio of  20: 1)  and varying the rate of trade-off between lost workday injur- 
ies and disabling injuries from a situation in which both receive equal value to 
one in which disabling injuries have a value five times as great as a lost work- 
day injury. The other major assumption needed pertains to the efficiency of the 
regulation in reducing risk. OMB indicated that the risk reduction that would 
be experienced would be on the order of 5 percent, whereas OSHA estimated 
the impact of the regulation as reducing injuries by 10 percent. 
Table 7.4 includes each of these benefit-weighting assumptions and provides 
calculations for both the OMB and the OSHA risk assessments. The first row 
of statistics in table 7.4 consists of the net discounted costs minus all mone- 
Table 7.4  Summary of Benefit and Cost Effects of the OSHA Hazard 
Communication Regulation 
Lost Workday Equivalents 
Weights, I,  1,20?  Weights, 1,5,20:' 
Effectiveness  Effectiveness 
5%  10%  5%  10% 
Net discounted costs less  2.632  X lo9  2.616 X  lo9  2.632 X lo9  2.616 X  lo9 
Total lost workday case  9.5 X  104  18.9 X  104  24.7 X 104  49.7 X  104 
monetized benefits ($) 
equivalents (discounted) 
case equivalent ($) 
Source:  Viscusi (1982). 
"These  are the relative weights placed on lost workday cases (always I), disabling illnesses (1 or 
5), and cancers (always 20) in constructing a measure of lost workday case equivalents. 
Net discounted cosflost workday  27,900  14,000  10.700  5,300 471  Health and Safety Regulation 
tized benefits, thus providing a net financial impact figure that can be used in 
calculating the new cost per unit of health impact. The second row provides 
the estimated discounted total lost workday case equivalents for the regulation 
using the weights given at the top of the table. The bottom row of table 7.4 
presents the estimated discounted cost per lost workday case equivalent in- 
jury prevented. 
Whether the regulation should be pursued depends on whether this cost- 
effectiveness measure is greater than the estimated value of nonfatal injuries. 
My  past estimates indicated an implicit value of  injuries on the order of 
$23,000-$35,000 (in 1982  dollars) so that, for three of the four sets of assump- 
tions listed, the regulation clearly passes a benefit-cost test. In one instance, 
the benefits exceed the cost except for the lowest end of the range of estimates 
of the implicit values that workers attach to injuries. 
Secretary of Labor Donovan indicated that he viewed this analysis as provid- 
ing support for the regulation, but OMB regulation head Christopher DeMuth 
maintains that he was not fully persuaded (see Earley 1985).  The ultimate deci- 
sion to issue the regulation may reflect in part the increased strength of  the 
regulatory agencies after the initial period of deregulation.  Moreover, the regu- 
lation had the strong support of labor as well as of chemical industry groups, 
who sought to avoid the costs associated with a variety of different state warn- 
ings regulations by having a uniform national regulation. 
The policy outcome was not as consequential as the process that took place. 
The terms of the debate had changed dramatically since the 1970s. Regulatory 
agencies and the White House oversight group focused their attention on 
whether the benefits of the regulation exceeded the costs, whereas in earlier 
administrations such concerns were subsidiary. Agencies had viewed their role 
as being governed by a higher-level agenda in which formal trade-offs of this 
type were not permitted. 
The new enthusiasm of agencies for the value-of-life approach can be traced 
primarily to  its effect on the attractiveness of  policies.  This methodology 
boosts the monetized value of health benefits by a factor of ten, which is ap- 
proximately the ratio of the estimated implicit value of life to the present value 
of  the earnings of  workers for whom these values are estimated. Although 
agency decisions are seldom dictated solely by benefit-cost concerns, the prep- 
aration of proper benefit assessments represents a substantial dividend of the 
OMB oversight effort. 
7.4.3 
The net effect of the effort to strike a balance between benefits and costs is 
shown in the cost per life saved statistics in table 7.5. Since these figures per- 
tain to average costs per life saved rather than marginal costs, the tests indicate 
whether the regulation is preferable to no regulation, not whether the level of 
stringency is optimal. An appropriate reference point for assessing how far we 
should move down this table in terms of policy acceptability  is the value of life 
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Table 7.5  The Cost of Various Risk-Reducing Regulations per Life Saved 
Cost per 
Life Saved 
Year and  Initial Annual  Annual Lives  (millions of 
Status  Agency  RisP  Saved  1984 $) 
Pass benefit-cost test 
Unvented space heaters 
Oil and gas well service 
Cabin fire protection 
Passive restraintshelts 
Underground construction 
Alcohol and drug control 
Servicing wheel rims 
Seat cushion flammability 
Floor emergency lighting 
Concrete and masonry 
Hazard communication 
Benzenelfugitive emissions 







Uranium mill tailings 

















































































2.7 in 105 
1.1 in 103 
6.5 in lo8 
9.1 in lo5 
1.6 in lo3 
1.8 in lo6 
1.4 in lo5 
1.6 in lo7 
2.2 in lo8 
1.4 in lo5 
4.0 in lo5 
2.1 in lo5 
2.1 in 104 
1.4 in 104 
8.8 in 104 
8.0 in 104 
4.4 in 105 
9.0 in lo4 
4.3 in 104 
4.3 in lo4 
6.7 in los 
2.9 in lo5 
3.8 in los 
6.0 in lo7 
4.3 in 106 
1.4 in los 
2.0 in lo6 
2.6 in 104 
1.1 in lo6 
2.3 in lo8 
2.5 in 104 































































,010  72,000.00 
Source: Mona11 (1986, 30). These statistics were updated by John F.  Morrall 111 via unpublished 
communication with the author, 10 July 1990. 
Note: P, F,  or R: proposed, final rule, or rejected, respectively. 
OSHA-S = OSHA safety regulations. 
OSHA-H = OSHA health regulations. 
FRA = Federal Railroad Administration. 
EDB = Ethylene dibromide. 
'Annual deaths per exposed population. An exposed population of  lo3  is 1,OoO.  104 is 10,000,  etc. 473  Health and Safety Regulation 
estimates in the literature at that time (see Thaler and Rosen 1976; Smith 1976; 
Viscusi 1979, 1983). Workers in high-risk jobs value each expected death at 
under $1 million, the value of life of workers in typical blue-collar risk jobs 
was on the order of $3 million, and the value of life of individuals in very high- 
income positions may be $7 million or more, but these last estimates are the 
least reliable. 
Judged by these standards, many of the regulations in the 1980s clearly pass 
a benefit-cost test. The policies of the FAA appear to be outstanding bargains. 
Their low costs per life saved figures should not, however, be viewed as a 
regulatory success. A main contributor to this low figure is that the FAA valued 
the lives saved in airplane crashes using the present value of the lost earnings of 
the accident victims. This approach underestimates the value of life of airplane 
passengers by  more than an order of magnitude. In one case, the FAA dis- 
missed repairs of the DC-10 as being not worthwhile because of the low level 
of  the risk, whereas a proper benefit-cost calculation indicates that the risk 
reductions were clearly desirable.I6  Application of value of life principles and 
benefit-cost analysis would have led an agency to be more aggressive. 
The cutoff in table 7.5 for policies with benefits in excess of their costs is 
probably just below the regulation of  benzene/fugitive emissions, with a cost 
per life saved of $2.8 million. Policies below that regulation in the table would 
not pass a benefit-cost test unless they protect populations with comparatively 
high values per life. OMB rejected none of the policies with lower costs per 
life, whereas they rejected eight policies with higher costs per life. OMB 
blocked some of the particularly inefficient regulations, although several regu- 
lations with very low efficacy were enacted. Indeed, the minimum threshold 
for OMB to reject a regulation is quite high. None of the regulations in table 
7.5 with costs per life saved below $142 million were rejected. OMB’s efficacy 
is apparently limited to the most extreme instances of regulatory excess. 
Given the uncertainties involved with benefit-cost analysis, the character of 
the agency’s legislative mandates, and the continued ability of regulatory agen- 
cies to wield substantial influence, the most that could have been hoped for is 
an elimination of the most unattractive policies from a benefit-cost standpoint. 
By that criterion, substantial progress was made. 
7.5  Sunset Actions and Regulatory Reforms 
7.5.1  The Reform Record 
The widespread dissatisfaction with the character of  regulatory standards 
has long led regulatory reformers to urge modification of  these regulations. 
President Ford’s Task Force on Regulatory Reform proposed that OSHA’s stan- 
dards be replaced by more performance-oriented alternatives. More generally, 
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since the original regulations had seldom been based on benefit-cost grounds, 
there was always a potential gain from altering previous policies. 
The major sunset action of  the Carter administration was the decision by 
OSHA director Eula Bingham to eliminate or modify 928 OSHA regulations 
in October 1978. Although many of the changes that she instituted were only 
editorial and did not alter the substantive focus of  the regulation, this regula- 
tory pruning eliminated the “nitpicking” aspects of OSHA regulation, which 
were the source of widespread ridicule of OSHA’s efforts. 
A potentially ambitious effort at deregulation occurred in 1980, as Carter 
administration economists developed an automobile industry relief package. 
The auto industry bore the brunt of a substantial body of regulatory costs, 
including emissions requirements, safety standards, and fuel economy stan- 
dards. Some regulatory critics believed these costs contributed to the economic 
decline of the automobile industry. However, the timing of the main cost in- 
creases-the  late 1960s, the early 1970s, and 1980-81-does  not coincide 
with the economic decline of the auto industry. A more influential factor was 
the rise in fuel prices in the 1970s  and the shift to small cars. Substantive action 
to support a pivotal industry in an election year did, however, offer political 
benefits. 
The Carter administration developed a reform package that provided only 
very limited relief. Its principal component was a proposal to reduce the strin- 
gency of high-altitude emissions requirements, which offered a payoff of $500 
million over a three-year period. The rest of the package had little substance 
because policy  changes were  opposed by  the EPA  and  NHTSA adminis- 
trators.” 
7.5.2  Reagan’s Auto Industry Relief Package 
The advent of the Reagan administration  marked a change in the regulatory 
climate. Shortly after taking office, the Reagan administration suspended the 
“midnight regulations” issued by the Carter administration in its closing days 
and ordered a reexamination of their merits. This effort yielded some partial 
dividends. As  Council of  Economic Advisers  member  William Niskanen 
(1988, 11  8) observed, “Of  the 172 proposed rules that were suspended, for 
example, 112 were approved without change, and only eighteen were with- 
drawn. OIRA’s batting average would never again be as high.” 
The Reagan administration’s most comprehensive deregulation effort was its 
automobile industry relief package. The agenda for this reform effort was not 
a product of the Reagan administration efforts alone. Many of the regulations 
included in this group had previously been opposed at the time of their promul- 
gation by the White House economists, many of whom were now at OMB. In 
addition, some of  the components of the relief package had previously been 
17. For a detailed recounting of the Carter administration experience, see Eads and Fix (1984, 
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advocated by the Carter administration economists for inclusion in the 1980 
relief package but were not included because of opposition from the affected 
agencies. 
The impetus for reform stemmed in part from the rise in regulatory costs in 
1980 and 1981. The estimates by White (1982) indicate that the total costs of 
emission regulations per automobile mushroomed from $559 in 1979 to $906 
in 1980 and then to $1,551 in 1981. Safety regulation costs were in addition to 
this amount. Estimates by  Crandall et al. (1986) suggest that the additional 
equipment cost per automobile rose from $431-$641  in 1979 to $512-$822 in 
1981 and that the fuel penalty increased from $1  16 in 1979 to $159 in 1981. 
The Reagan package for relief of  the automobile industry consequently had 
been developed in an environment of rapid cost escalation for automobiles that 
could be traced to the influence of government standards. 
Table 7.6  summarizes the components of the package, their status as of 
mid-1983, and the cost savings that the administration  claimed for them.’* The 
measures with the greatest savings for industry included the delay of the paint 
shop standard, the elimination of the driver vision standard, the delay of the 
tougher hydrocarbon solution standards, the scrapping of the safety standards 
for explosive multipiece tire rims, and the delay of the passenger restraint re- 
quirements. Overall, this reform package provides a very comprehensive pro- 
gram of regulatory relief. 
The success of this reform effort stemmed not only from the White House 
regulatory reformers’ zeal but also from the nature of the Reagan appointments 
to regulatory agencies. The NHTSA head, Raymond Peck, has been justifiably 
termed “an expert deregulator” (see Graham 1989, 145), and EPA administra- 
tor Anne Gorsuch developed a well-established reputation for scaling back the 
efforts of her agency. 
Although some of the items in table 7.6 represent attractive reforms, others 
may  not pass the usual economic tests. The paint shop requirement, for ex- 
ample, may  represent the most cost-effective way  of  meeting hydrocarbon 
emissions standards. Abolition of  this regulation would lead to more costly 
controls being required for other establishments near automobile paint shops, 
such as gasoline stations (see Eads and Fix 1984, 132). The costs of the regula- 
tion were, however, quite high, particularly in the short run.  By delaying the 
regulation, OMB gave firms additional opportunity to change over to the new 
technologies required, greatly reducing the ultimate costs of the regulation. 
The merits of passive restraints are also much debated, even by economists. 
Some of these deregulation efforts ultimately were viewed as constituting 
18. One of the  most expensive components is the  high-altitude emissions standard  that  was 
adopted earlier as part of the Carter administration reforms but  for which the estimated savings 
were $500  million as opposed to $1.3 billion. It should also be noted that the legitimacy of the 
“public”  cost calculation and the “industry” cost calculation is questionable because of the compli- 
cated way in which costs affect prices. These calculations often assume, e.g., that the safety mea- 
sures are not valued by consumers but are simply a deadweight loss. 476  W. Kip Viscusi 
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Table 7.6  The Reagan Administration’s  Auto Reform Package 
5-Year Savings 
($millions) 













Rules Acted on: 
Gas-tank vapors 
Emissions tests 
Declined to order new controls on cars (Apr. 1981) 
Streamlined certification of industry tests on 
vehicles (Oct. 1981, Nov. 1982) 
Raised allowable “failure rate” for test of light 
trucks and heavy-duty engines from 10 to 40 
percent (Jan. 1983) 
Reduced spot checks of emissions of vehicles on 
assembly lines by 42 percent; delayed assembly- 
line tests of heavy-duty trucks until 1986 (Jan. 
1983) 
Ended assembly-line tests at high altitude, relying 
instead on industry data (Apr. 1981) 
Allowed industry to self-certify vehicles as 
meeting high-altitude emission standards (Apr. 
1981) 
Consolidated industry applications for temporary 
exemptions from tougher emissions standards 
for nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide (Sep. 
1981) 
Delayed until 1983 tougher hydrocarbon pollution 
standards for auto paint shops (Oct. 1981) 
Cut paperwork required to exempt prototype 
vehicles from environmental standards (July 
1982) 
Scrapped existing 1981 rule and second proposed 
rule setting standards for driver’s field of view 
(June 1982) 
Decided not to set stiffer fuel economy standards 
to replace those expiring in 1985 (Apr. 1981) 
Revoked rule-setting standards for speedometers 
and tamper-resistant odometers (Feb. 1982) 
Scrapped proposal to set safety standards for 
explosive multipiece tire rims (Feb. 1982) 
Eased from 30 to 20 percent the steepness of 
grades on which post-1984 truck and bus brakes 
must hold (Dec. 1981) 
Scrapped proposal to equip vehicles with low-tire- 
pressure indicators (Aug. 1981) 
Scrapped proposal to set standards to prevent auto 
battery explosions (Aug. 1981) 
Revoked requirement that consumers be told of 
reserve load capacity of tires; eased tire makers’ 
reporting requirements (June 1982) 
103  1.300 
5  ... 
19  129 
1  1 
.L 
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300  75 
...  1.8 
...  130 
...  ... 
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Table 7.6  (continued) 
5-Year Savings 
($millions) 





Seat belt comfort 








Eased antitheft and locking steering wheel 
standards for open-body vehicles (June 1981) 
Streamlined semiannual reports of automakers on 
their progress in meeting fuel economy goals 
(Aug. 1982) 
Suspended rule requiring industry to rate tires 
according to tread wear, traction, and heat 
resistance (Feb. 1983) 
the requirement that all vehicles have ID 
numbers as an aid to police (May 1983) 
Scrapped proposal to set standards for seat belt 
comfort and convenience (June 1983) 
Downgraded from standard to administrative rule 
Failed to revise Clean Air Act order ending weaker 
high-altitude emissions standards in 1984; eased 
through regulatory changes 
Failed to revise Clean Air Act order to cut large 
trucks’ hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide 
emissions by 90 percent by 1984; standard was 
delayed until 1985 
nitrogen oxide emissions from light trucks and 
heavy-duty engines by 75 percent by  1984; 
regulatory changes under study 
Delayed a proposal to scrap specific particulate 
standards for some diesels in favor of an average 
standard for all diesels; stiffer standards delayed 
from 1985 to 1987 
plan to drop methane as a regulated 
hydrocarbon 
1982 autos be equipped with passive restraints; 
revocation overturned by  Supreme Court in June 
1983 
bumpers must resist damage; change is on 
appeal 
Failed to ease Clean Air Act order reducing 
Shelved because of “serious” costs; questions a 
Delayed and then revoked requirement that post- 
Cut from 5 to 2.5 MPH the speed at which 
...  ... 
...  .I 
10 
38  1,300 
105  536 
1  50  563 
40  523 
...  ... 
428  98  1 
308 
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regulatory relief rather than regulatory reform. The Supreme Court eventually 
overturned NHTSA’s rescission of the air bag rule. 
There are likely to be some disagreements regarding the particular compo- 
nents of  the program as well as the permanence of  the regulatory reforms. 
On balance, however, these auto industry relief measures primarily delayed 
regulatory costs. They did not alter the long-term structure of auto regulations 
in any fundamental manner. 
Perhaps the main reason that there was a failure to restructure the regulations 
rather than simply reducing their cost is that the overriding objective was not 
regulatory reform but auto industry relief. OMB Director Stockman (1986) 
viewed these policies with some disapproval, as he considered them to be a 
thinly veiled policy of protectioni~m.’~  The overriding objective of cost reduc- 
tion rather than meaningful reform limited the degree to which this political 
success was also a beneficial reform measure. 
7.5.3 
Other reform efforts met with less success. OSHA, for example, reexamined 
its cotton dust regulation that had been bitterly opposed by  both the textile 
industry and Carter administration economists in a dispute that ultimately led 
to a battle in the U.S.  Supreme Court. OSHA’s reassessment of the regulation 
indicated that the original regulatory analysis was wildly inaccurate and that 
the standard could be profitably altered in several ways. For example, a policy 
of  low-cost environmental controls (e.g., taping leaks in duct work) coupled 
with testing and rotating workers would achieve most of the health gains of the 
original standard. One could also question whether a cost of several hundred 
thousand dollars for each case of partial or total disability prevented was rea- 
sonable. The Supreme Court’s decision to explicitly rule out a benefit-cost test 
in the cotton dust case and to require that the agencies set the lowest “feasible” 
standard did not preclude performance-oriented  alternatives  or some balancing 
of competing interests. However, by  the time of the Reagan administration 
review, the largest textile manufacturers were already in compliance with the 
cotton dust regulation, leading them to join with labor in advocating retention 
of the status quo. 
The lack of enthusiasm for altering a regulatory regime that was once bit- 
terly opposed is likely to be a more general phenomenon whenever firms incur 
fixed costs of compliance. The regulatory reforms that OSHA did undertake 
were largely of a piecemeal variety. For example, OSHA revised its electrical 
Other Reforms and Sunset Actions 
19. As Stockman (1986,155) observed, “Lewis and the others had cooked up a theory that the 
auto industry had been so overregulated and crippled by air bags, pollution control devices, safety 
standards, and other government-imposed Ralph Naderite schemes that it was now up to the gov- 
ernment to undo the damage. .  . .  This cover-up for protectionism really frosted me.” 479  Health and Safety Regulation 
standards for the construction industry to be in conformance  with new industry 
standards (29 CFR sec. 1926.800 [  11 [  1985]).*O 
The overall performance of the Reagan administration’s deregulation and 
sunset actions is mixed. Of  119 regulations reviewed by  the President’s Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, seventy-six regulations were revised, in twenty- 
seven cases revisions were proposed, and in sixteen cases revisions by the task 
force were still under way  when this group issued its final regulatory report 
(Presidential Task Force 1983,68). 
The extent of the various revisions cited in the report card that the Residen- 
tial Task Force issued on its performance is not indicated, but particularly in 
the early years it is evident that some progress was made. The fact that the task 
force was disbanded in 1983 is a reflection of the decreasing prospects over 
time for altering the structure of regulation. The climate for regulatory reform 
had clearly changed, and there would soon be a return to the previous regula- 
tory environment. 
Sunset actions and other changes in the structure of existing regulation are 
difficult to achieve. With regulations already in place, industry’s interest in 
altering these regulations is divided. Moreover, shifting the character of regula- 
tions over time may impose additional adjustment costs. The initial wave of 
deregulation efforts under the Reagan administration isolated some promising 
candidates for change. The greatest subsequent gains could be achieved by 
focusing on new regulation proposals. 
7.6  New Regulatory Initiatives 
7.6.1  Environmental Policy 
The major regulatory innovation sought by economists in the environmental 
area has been the greater utilization of market-based policies. Notwithstanding 
the widespread enthusiasm of economists and reformers for various forms of 
emissions trading options, such measures remain the exception rather than 
the rule. 
Table 7.7 summarizes the performance of these policies through 1984. The 
most popular market-oriented  trading system is that of netting, whereby a firm 
can modify its existing plant and equipment in a manner that increases the 
level of  pollution from one source, provided that it also decreases pollution 
emissions from other sources in such a manner that the net increase does equal 
that of a major source. The netting policy is restricted to internal trading for 
a particular firm. By  its very design, this effort should have little effect on 
20. Through this standards reform, OSHA attempted to bring its regulation into conformance 
with the National Electrical Code, which had undergone its last major revision in 1981-four 
years before the final OSHA standard was promulgated. Table 7.7  Summary of Emissions Trading Activity 
Activity 
Estimated No. of  Estimated No. of  Estimated Cost Savings  Environmental 
Internal Transactions  External Transactions  ($millions)  Quality Impact 
Netting  5,000-  None  25-300  in permitting 
in emission control 
costs 
12,000  costs; 500-12,OOO 




Federally approved  40  2  300 
State approved  89  0  135 
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environmental quality. Table 7.7 indicates that the emission control cost sav- 
ings from netting are substantial. 
The second most frequent emissions trading option is that of offsets. This 
option introduced in 1976 permits construction of new facilities that will create 
pollution in areas of the country that exceed maximum allowable concentration 
for pollutants. Companies must, however, purchase offsets from existing facili- 
ties that provide for more than equivalent reduction of the same pollutant from 
pollution sources that are already in compliance. By 1984, most of the offset 
transactions were internal rather than involving external trades, and the cost 
savings are not believed to be substantial. 
The third trading concept in table 7.7 is the bubble policy. The Carter admin- 
istration introduced the bubble policy in December 1979. By  envisioning an 
artificial bubble around a firm for which a firm must be in compliance in terms 
of  its total level of pollution, rather than having to meet a particular require- 
ment for each pollution source, a firm can establish the most cost-effective 
mechanism for achieving the pollution reduction within its “bubble.” By  1984, 
bubbles had been adopted in fewer than 200 instances, with cost savings be- 
lieved to be under $500 million. 
The final trading option-banking-enables  firms to store rights to pollu- 
tion over time if they are in compliance with their standards and then use these 
compliance rights as offsets against pollution. This policy enables firms to 
avoid sacrificing pollution rights should they choose to replace their current 
high-polluting plant and equipment with a more efficient lower-pollution tech- 
nology. The use of banking policies has, however, been infrequent. 
These market-oriented systems have generated nontrivial financial benefits, 
without any substantially detrimental environmental consequences. The small 
scale of  these efforts reflects the extent to which the EPA has viewed these 
market  systems as experimental options rather than  as  an integral part of 
agency policy. 
Firms must obtain EPA  approval to utilize these trading options, and the 
costs of this approval are often substantial. Approval of the applications is not 
always forthcoming, as there has been long-term suspicion by most EPA offi- 
cials and environmentalists more generally of market options. Pollution rights 
trading policies involve costs in locating a seller of  emissions credits and in 
establishing the terms of trade. Firms also face substantial uncertainties when 
they embark on the emissions trading path since there is no guarantee that these 
experimental EPA policies will continue for the duration of the investment that 
they must make. 
Although Carter administration and Reagan administration economists had 
long advocated such market approaches, it was not until the Bush administra- 
tion that such efforts became a prominent part of the nation’s declared eco- 
nomic agenda (CEA 1990, 193-97).  The degree to which these efforts will 
become a central component of EPA policy is not yet apparent. 
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the 1980s, it did undertake other initiatives. Its air pollution efforts were partic- 
ularly active, especially with respect to the continuing phase down of the use 
of lead in gasoline. In  1985, the permissible lead content in gasoline was re- 
duced from 1.0 grams per gallon to 0.5 grams per gallon, and, in  1986, the 
permissible level dropped to 0.1 grams per gallon. What was particularly note- 
worthy about this increasing stringency of the lead standard is that it was also 
supported by  sound regulatory analysis demonstrating the excess of benefits 
over costs (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1988, 16). EPA also ex- 
panded its efforts against airborne toxins in the 1980s, and it undertook sub- 
stantial efforts to reduce indoor air pollution stemming from asbestos and 
radon. 
As will be discussed below within the context of enforcement, implementa- 
tion of the Superfund legislation (CERCLA, 1980) was also a new concern of 
the agency in the 1980s. The 1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) amendments were also a major legislative initiative through which 
Congress imposed a series of  deadlines for EPA  actions, thus limiting the 
agency's discretion. 
Two other major additions to EPA's  agenda were the long-range problems of 
acid rain and the greenhouse effect. In each case, EPA identified major prob- 
lems meriting national attention, but it failed to justify the economic merits of 
these efforts. The result has been a delay for greater study of these problems 
and symbolic efforts as part of  the international dialogue on these issues.21 
With respect to the global environmental problems, the United States partici- 
pated in the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which 
led to the freezing of chlorofluorocarbon production levels, and in 1989 the 
United States participated in the Paris Summit focusing on global environmen- 
tal concerns. To the extent that the United States has been an activist member 
of  these groups, it has been through fostering recognition of  the economic 
costs involved. 
The desirability of particular global warming and acid rain policies remains 
in doubt. Portney (1990) estimates that the acid rain provisions of  the  1990 
Clean Air Act amendments will provide $5 billion in benefits with costs in the 
$2-$9  billion range. These acid rain provisions are desirable only if the costs 
are not much above the midpoint of the cost range. The exploratory analysis of 
global warming policies by Nordhaus (1990) likewise indicated mixed results 
regarding the attractiveness of the policy measures that have been proposed. 
Actions such as control of chlorofluorocarbons are economically  desirable, but 
very ambitious policies may not be worthwhile. The main shortcoming of EPA 
policies with respect to these long-run environmental issues is the continuing 
need to identify the specific policies that merit adoption in terms of  the net 
benefits that they offer society. 
21. Niskanen (1988) reports that David Stockman blocked the acid rain initiative developed by 
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Table 7.8  Trends in EPA Regulation Costs 
Present Value of Costs ($billions) 
of EPA Regulations 
Year  Proposed Rules  Final Rules 
1987  I0  14 
1988  21  84 
1989  17  6 
1990  250  95 
Source: Estimates prepared by  U.S. Office of Management and Budget, August 1990. Figures for 
1989  and 1990 are preliminary. 
Although EPA was not successful in  winning approval for these policies, 
overall the late 1980s marked a dramatic resurgence in EPA regulatory activity. 
Table 7.8 summarizes the present value of costs for major EPA rules proposed 
or finalized from 1987 to 1990. These cost levels are quite impressive, includ- 
ing proposed regulations with costs of $70 billion in 1987 and $250 billion in 
1990 and final regulations with costs of $84  billion in 1988 and $95 billion in 
1990. To put these levels in perspective, note that, during the expansionary 
period of EPA regulation before Reagan, the costs associated with proposed 
EPA regulations were $26-$29  billion in 1979 and for the entire period 1975- 
80 were only $218-$296  billion.22 
EPA had not simply returned to its earlier degree of regulatory activity; by 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, EPA was undertaking more costly regula- 
tory initiatives than at any time in its history. 
7.6.2  Pharmaceutical Regulation 
One of the most highly publicized areas of successful new regulatory initia- 
tives was for pharmaceuticals. Critics of the FDA had long charged that the 
agency erred on the side of preventing adverse effects of newly approved drugs 
as opposed to taking into consideration the benefits that new drugs may 
One FDA official remarked that no one was  going to blame him for slow 
approval of a beneficial drug, but he would be blamed for approving the next 
Thalidomide." 
Throughout the 1980s,  the OMB regulatory oversight group sought to expe- 
dite the FDA drug approval process. The political leverage for achieving an 
accelerated approval time for new drugs was increased by the AIDS constitu- 
ency. Since the prospects of patients suffering from life-threatening diseases 
22. These estimates are provided in Viscusi (1983, p. 143, table 8.2). 
23. For an extensive assessment of the FDA's  drug approval policies, see Grabowski and Ver- 
24. This comment was made to me  by  an FDA official in a training  session on the use of 
non (1983). 
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such as AIDS were very poor, a policy of giving expedited approval to these 
drugs offered potential benefits with little apparent mortality risk. 
FDA adopted a general regulatory commitment to trying to accelerate the 
drug approval process without compromising its quality, and it established a 
special commitment to expediting the approval of drugs for diseases such as 
AIDS. 
The statistics in table 7.9 present the total number of new chemical entities 
approved and their approval time. Drugs that are ranked 1A are believed to be 
of substantial importance, and the 1AA drugs are generally drugs for diseases 
such as AIDS. If  we  contrast the patterns before and after the FDA policy 
change in 1987, there is no striking departure from earlier trends. The number 
of new drug approvals increased somewhat from the earlier years, particularly 
given the low drug approval rates in 1980 and 1983. The number of approvals 
given to the 1A and 1AA drugs increased in 1988 and  1989 from the level in 
the mid-l980s, but the total number of such approvals was almost identical to 
the rate of approval in 1982-83. The speed of the drug approvals also did not 
change markedly. The average drug approval time in the late 1980s is not sub- 
stantially different from that in earlier years. The rate of approval for the 1A 
and  1AA drugs was particularly rapid in  1987 and  1989 but comparatively 
slow in 1988. 
The most that can be concluded from this evidence is that there has been 
some modest effort to target more drugs as being 1A or 1AA and to avoid the 
long lag time of  over three and a half years that was present in 1984. Since 
many of  the drugs involved in this approval process have been in the FDA 
pipeline for several years, the ultimate effects of a shift in FDA drug approval 
policy will not be fully apparent until the 1990s. The changes that have been 
Table 7.9  New Drug Approvals and Time to Approval 
Avg. Lag Time (months) from 
Submission to Approval  No. of  NCEs Approvals 

















































4 1  .OO 
22.05 
Source:  A11  figures are based on calculations by  the author using chronology of  new  chemical 
entities (NCEs) developed by the University of Rochester Center for Study of Drug Development, 
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made are consistent with the principles being advocated by most economists, 
and the extent of the changes evinced in FDA activities has been modest. 
7.6.3  Occupational Safety Regulation 
The  literature on  OSHA has  long  stressed the  need  to  go  beyond  the 
technology-forcing nature of the initial era of OSHA regulation. One such 
performance-oriented mechanism is the 1980 OSHA proposed hazard com- 
munication  regulation included as part  of  Carter’s “midnight regulations” 
package. This regulation established chemical labeling in the manufacturing 
industry. 
The ultimate regulation issued by  the Reagan administration expanded on 
the original Carter proposal by  adding material safety data sheets. Chemical 
suppliers were required to provide downstream firms with information regard- 
ing the chemical ingredients. Although potentially attractive in theory, the ma- 
terial safety data component of the regulation has been of little benefit because 
of the overly technical nature of the information provided. In addition to being 
the most costly new regulatory initiative in the risk area during the first Reagan 
term, this regulation was also innovative in many respects. This informational 
regulation represented a shift in the domain of regulatory activity that occurred 
throughout the 1980s. Right-to-know measures at the federal and local level 
proliferated in an effort to inform individuals of  the risks from exposures on 
the job, exposures from the environment, and exposures from products. 
The other major innovation in OSHA’s regulatory structure was the adoption 
of the permissible exposure limits of the American Conference of Governmen- 
tal Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). OSHA’s original standards for health risk 
exposures were based on approximately  400 exposure limits that had been rec- 
ommended by  the ACGIH, which is an industry advisory group. Each year 
a committee of  fifteen individuals, chiefly hygienists and toxicologists from 
industry, meets to set threshold limit values for chemical exposures, where the 
objective is to achieve levels for which “no injurious effect will result no matter 
how often the exposure is repeated” (see Stokinger 1984). Although a zero- 
risk exposure is not necessarily optimal, this industry group informally incor- 
porates concerns of fea~ibility.~~  The ACGIH had developed 200 standards for 
new health hazard exposures as well as 100 revisions of  the exposure limits 
for existing OSHA standards that had been based on the earlier ACGIH expo- 
sure limits. Adopting all these revisions through a generic regulation rather 
than through a substance-by-substance  rule-making approach enabled OSHA 
to expand its efforts in the health area, which had been given insufficient atten- 
tion compared to safety concerns. 
Although this regulation appears to be attractive on balance, its main short- 
25. For the permissible exposure limits advocated by the ACGIH for which there is evidence 
on the benefit-cost trade-offs, the cost per case of cancer prevented appears to be generally in the 
reasonable range (see Broder and Morrall  1983; and Mendeloff 1988). 486  W.  Kip Viscusi 
coming is that the process for generating such broadly based standards did not 
originate within the agency but was instead devised by an industry group. This 
process raises the long-term possibility that the function of  such industry- 
designed standards will be to restrain competition and to promote the vested 
interests of the particular firms represented in the industry organization rather 
than to advance the interests of  society at large. This type of capture theory 
has been offered by Stigler (1971) in the case of economic regulation. If OSHA 
were to continue to base its regulations on guidelines recommended by indus- 
try, then this procedure would all but ensure the long-run capture of OSHA. 
These dangers are also apparent in other areas of  OSHA regulation, as the 
lobbying of the large textile firms in support of the retention of the cotton dust 
standard illustrated. 
The other innovations in OSHA’s regulatory agenda were more incremental. 
A collaborative effort of OSHA and the OMB regulatory oversight group led 
to an innovative OSHA grain-handling  Grain dust levels in grain- 
handling facilities often lead to explosions involving the deaths of dozens of 
workers. In 1984, OSHA proposed to reduce the risks posed by such exposures 
by decreasing the permissible grain dust level. The outcome that resulted from 
the collaboration by OSHA and OMB offered firms a series of several perfor- 
mance-oriented alternatives that they could choose in order to achieve compli- 
ance: (i) clean up the dust whenever it exceeds one-eighth of an inch; (ii) clean 
up  the  dust  at  least  once  per  shift; or  (iii)  use  pneumatic dust  control 
equipment.27 
The flexibility offered by these various alternatives  enables firms to choose 
the most cost-effective mechanism for achieving the desired safety objective. 
Although the introduction of flexibility of this type did not become a prevalent 
characteristic of new OSHA standards, it did mark the introduction of a greater 
degree of diversity in the regulatory approach than had been reflected in previ- 
ous OSHA efforts. 
Perhaps most important is the trend in the level of OSHA regulation. As in 
the case of  EPA, there was a resurgence of  regulation in the late 1980s. As 
indicated by the present value of the costs of proposed and final rules summa- 
rized in table 7.10, new OSHA regulations were generating substantial costs. 
Major regulations proposed in 1988 and 1989 would impose costs of $12 bil- 
lion and $10.5 billion, respectively. If we exclude the OSHA carcinogen policy 
that was proposed in 1978 but never adopted, proposed OSHA standards im- 
posed costs of only $35-$44  billion for the entire period 1975-80.** The level 
26. A description of the activities and views of the oversight group is provided by the Office of 
Management and  Budget’s 1984 unpublished memorandum “OSHA’s Proposed Standards for 
Grain Handling Facilities.”  See also the letter from Christopher DeMuth, administrator for infor- 
mation and regulatory affairs, OMB, to  the  solicitor of the  U.S. Department of Labor, Francis 
X. Lilly. 
27. Office of Management and Budget, “OSHA’s Proposed Standards,” 5-6. 
28. For supporting data, see Viscusi (1983, 143-44). 487  Health and  Safety Regulation 
Table 7.10  Trends in OSHA Regulation Costs 
Present Value of  Costs 
($billions) of  OSHA 
Regulations 
Proposed  Final 
Year  Rules  Rules 
1987  2.8  2.1 
1988  12  .2 
1989  10.5  12.7 
Source:  Estimates prepared by U.S.  Office of Management and Budget, August 1990. 
of OSHA policy initiatives at the end of the second Reagan term had surpassed 
that of the pre-Reagan era. 
7.6.4  Traffic Safety Regulation 
One of NHTSA’s early success stories in the 1980s that promoted safety in 
an effective manner was the promulgation of the regulation for rear-window 
brake lights (Federal Register 49, no. 97 [17 May 19841 20818ff.). The instal- 
lation of  such brake lights reduces the reaction time of drivers of  following 
vehicles because of the greater visibility of  the single center high-mounted 
The Department of Transportation regulations with the broadest potential 
impact on fatalities were its safety belt standards. The Department of Transpor- 
tation issued regulations requiring the  enactment of  mandatory safety belt 
laws. If  this condition was  not met, the federal government would require 
phased installation of passive restraint systems. 
This compromise measure was a response to the U.S. Supreme Court deci- 
sion to overturn the automobile industry relief package’s rescission of the pas- 
sive restraint requirements. Since many of  the benefits of  passive restraints 
could be achieved through use of seat belts, this measure represents an effort 
to utilize the ability of the individual to reduce his or her own risk rather than 
always relying on a technological solution. The decision to leave the ultimate 
decision of whether mandatory safety belt laws would be enacted to the states 
is consistent with the Reagan administration’s principle of federalism. 
In this case, there is no apparent heterogeneity in the benefits or the costs of 
a mandatory seat belt requirement to warrant leaving this matter up to the 
states. Since most economic studies indicate that the benefits of seat belt use 
far exceed the costs, the case for making the standard nationwide seems quite 
strong, if a mandatory requirement overruling individual choice is sensible.29 
stop-lamp. 
29. For a review of  the benefits and costs of seat belt use, see Arnould and  Grabowski (1981). 488  W. Kip Viscusi 
7.6.5  Smoking and Individual Responsibility for Risk 
Perhaps the most aggressive new area of risk regulation in the  980s was 
with respect to smoking behavior. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop issued 
increasingly strident attacks against cigarette smoking, designating smoking 
as more addictive than heroin and calling for a smoke-free society by the year 
2000. Even the Council of Economic Advisers joined in the chorus of attacks 
against smoking, calling it the “greatest avoidable risk” (CEA 1987, 184). 
The governmental policy efforts against smoking took two forms. The first 
consisted of public attacks against cigarettes that usually accompanied the is- 
suance of the annual report of the surgeon general on smoking. Such reports 
ideally inform individuals regarding the risks of  smoking, thus promoting a 
greater balancing of risks and benefits in individuals’ decision making. The 
surgeon general’s reports, however, went beyond information provision. They 
became advocacy documents against smoking behavior. 
The second form of  policy action consisted of  a change in the warnings 
accompanying cigarettes. In 1984, Congress mandated a series of rotating cig- 
arette warnings alerting consumers to a diverse set of risks pertaining to ciga- 
rettes. These warnings replaced the single warning in place since 1969 that 
indicated that “cigarette smoking is dangerous to your health.” 
Changes in hazard warning programs and public information campaigns can 
be easily undertaken by a policymaker wishing to pursue antismoking policies. 
These measures are more feasible than changes in the cigarette tax or national 
regulations pertaining to smoking behavior. However, as the percentage of 
smokers in society declined in the 1980s, the pressures against smoking in- 
creased. 
Table 7.11 summarizes several key smoking trends. The total cigarette con- 
sumption per capita dropped considerably in the 1980s. As cigarette compa- 
nies began to market their product to an increasingly smaller group, the price 
of cigarettes rose, which in turn also influences the number of people who will 
purchase the product. Cigarette taxes as a percentage of the retail price have 
dropped over the past twenty years, but the absolute level of this tax is much 
higher than before because of the rapid increase in the price of cigarettes. As 
the final columns in table 7.11 indicate, since the 1970s the percentage of the 
population smoking has been on the decline, and the percentage of  former 
smokers has been on the rise. 
Efforts by the surgeon general to publicize the potential risks of secondhand 
smoke contributed to widespread restrictions on cigarette smoking throughout 
the country. These have included regulations limiting smoking on airline flights 
as well as a diverse set of local smoking standards, particularly for restaurants. 
Although the main effect of the antismoking efforts has been to accentuate an 
already declining smoking trend and to increase the prevalence of restrictions 
on smoking, the shift in the acceptability of  this particular product risk has 
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Table 7.11  Principal Aspects of Smoking Behavior 
Cigarette Taxes 
Cigarette Price  as a % 
Cigarettes  per Pkg.  of Retail  Present Smoker  Former Smoker 
per Capita  ($avg.)  Price (median)  (”/.I  (%I 
1970  2,534  .39  46.8  36.7  17.9 
1980  2,821  .63  33.1  32.6  20.6 
1985  2,501  I .05  30.8  29.8  24.4 
1989  2,156  1.44  26.4  N.A.  N.A. 
Source: Tobacco Institute, The Tax Burden on Tobacco: for cigarettes per capita, see 1989, vol. 24 
(1990), p.  6;  for price per package and tax percentage, see 1970, vol. 5 (1971), p. 83, and 1980, 
vol. 15 (1981), p. 93. US.  Dept. of Commerce (1989, 119 [smoking percentages]). 
Nore; N.A. = not available. 
Particularly surprising is the nature of the discussion of smoking by govern- 
ment economists (CEA 1987,184-86). In its extensive discussion of smoking, 
the 1987 Economic Report of the President did little to address any of the eco- 
nomics issues at stake. To what extent is there a market failure? Do individuals 
have knowledge of the risks that smoking may pose? How substantial are the 
costs of changing smoking, and what is the welfare loss from this “addiction” 
phenomenon? For all these risks to individuals from their own decisions, do 
the discouraging effects of taxes eliminate any market failure? If current taxes 
do not eliminate the market failure, what level of taxes is needed? Finally, in 
the case of secondhand smoke, for which smoking restrictions do the benefits 
of regulation exceed the costs? Are we going to treat passive smoking risks as 
a trump card that dominates other concerns that might be present regardless of 
their magnitude? What is most striking is not the fact that society has under- 
taken such initiatives, largely through the personal energy of the surgeon gen- 
eral, but rather the fact that the oversight economists have  offered virtually 
unqualified support of these efforts in the absence of any regulatory analysis. 
Perhaps the main point that economists are making by  highlighting these 
antismoking efforts is that risks are not always the responsibility of a corpora- 
tion. Responsibility for risk taking must be shared by the individual as well. 
This theme pervades much of the Reagan administration’s efforts, and it pro- 
vides a counterpoint to the view that controlling risk is simply a responsibility 
of  government  and industry. However,  the  government has  not  yet  distin- 
guished situations where it is appropriate to rely on personal responsibility for 
making decisions and contexts in which we should interfere with this responsi- 
bility by establishing regulations to overrule these choices. 
7.6.6 
The early 1980s was not a period of major activity in terms of new regula- 
tions, but this hiatus was short lived. By the mid-l980s, the earlier pace of 
regulation had returned. 
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The chief new additions to the regulatory agenda marked a shift in the em- 
phasis on taking advantage of individual safety-enhancing actions to promote 
safety. The OSHA hazard communication  regulation and the increased empha- 
sis on mandatory seat belt usage were examples of this policy direction. The 
antismoking crusade also marked an emphasis on the role of  individual risk 
behavior, as did the risk communication  component of EPA’s  radon policy. The 
increases in states’ penalties against drunken driving were in a similar vein. 
The 1970s era of risk regulation was characterized by  an emphasis on engi- 
neering controls and technological solutions to safety, whereas the 1980s at- 
tempted to incorporate more recognition of individual actions. 
The extent of new regulatory activity was now, however,  great. The most 
prominent administrators of major risk regulation agencies with a strong com- 
mitment to their agency’s agenda were William Ruckelshaus and Lee Thomas. 
However, since these individuals succeeded Anne Gorsuch, their successful 
performance could do little more than reverse the damage that had already 
been done. Moreover, none of the appointees demonstrated a commitment to 
their agencies’ objectives coupled with a sound economic agenda for regula- 
tory reform. 
7.7  Strategies for Regulatory Enforcement 
In some contexts, regulatory enforcement is not a major concern. NHTSA 
can readily monitor whether firms are in compliance with automobile design 
standards since cars are a mass-produced product. Even an agency with a very 
small staff such as the CPSC has little difficulty in ascertaining whether firms 
are in compliance with its narrowly prescribed standards, such as safety cap re- 
quirements. 
In some cases, however, effective enforcement design and targeting is an 
integral part of  ensuring an effective regulatory program. The early OSHA 
enforcement efforts were characterized by infrequent inspections and low lev- 
els of penalties for violations, thus providing little incentive for firms to invest 
in safety. In contrast, EPA targets major sources of air and water pollution with 
at least one inspection annually. Nevertheless, a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) study in the early 1980s suggested that noncompliance  rates for air and 
water pollution regulations might be as high as 80 percent.3o  Internal EPA stud- 
ies indicate that enforcement for conventional pollutants is more effective than 
for unconventional pollutants. Enforcement problems for asbestos, toxic pol- 
lutants, and hazardous waste sites are much more difficult. 
One widely espoused recommendation by economists is to replace the reli- 
ance on a fleet of inspectors by  an injury tax or a pollution tax, such as a 
marketable pollution permit scheme. Environmentalists have never supported 
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such market-oriented policies because they have the appearance of enabling 
firms to buy their way out of safety and environmental improvements. Industry 
has provided little support for such a penalty system since creating effective 
incentives  involves the imposition of nontrivial  costs, thus increasing  the stakes 
above the current regime. 
Concern  with  effective  enforcement presupposes,  of  course,  that  the 
agency’s regulations are well designed. Unfortunately, standards for agencies 
such as OSHA and EPA are often excessively stringent. Lax enforcement is 
not necessarily the solution since exempting firms from any safety or environ- 
mental requirements is also not the ideal. In many cases, however, there is 
an effort to strike an appropriate balance by establishing phased compliance 
schedules to accommodate  the substantial economic costs that a firm may face. 
Because of  the difficulties of  adjusting for ill-designed regulations through 
diminished enforcement, I will use the effective enforcement reference point 
as the policy objective. 
7.7.1  OSHA’s Enforcement Efforts 
Under the Carter administration, OSHA’s  emphasis was on increasing the 
degree to which inspections focused on consequential hazards. The number of 
inspections undertaken declined, but the emphasis on serious violations and 
the level of penalties increased. This strategy complemented the standards re- 
form effort to eliminate the less consequential regulations. 
Thorne Auchter, Reagan’s first head of OSHA, sought to decrease the con- 
frontational role of OSHA by making inspections more of a consultative activ- 
ity. This low-key inspection effort was coupled with a decrease in the inspec- 
tion staff. To maintain any impact from inspections with a diminished number 
of full-scale inspections, one must increase their output. 
The innovation that Auchter made was to introduce what OSHA termed 
“records check inspections” (see U.S.  Department of  Labor  1984, ii-iii). 
Auchter introduced a new, more cursory type of  inspection so that the total 
number of  inspections rose while the number of  comprehensive inspections 
declined. Beginning in October 1981, OSHA inspectors at a firm examined the 
firm’s lost workday accident rate for the past two years (or three years in the 
case of very small employers). Firms with injury rates below the national man- 
ufacturing average were exempted from inspections, and firms with injury 
rates in excess of the national average received a detailed inspection. This pro- 
cedure established a mechanism for targeting inspections to enhance their pro- 
ductivity and contributed to Auchter’s reputation as a “well-informed and ef- 
fective manager” (see Niskanen  1988,  130). By fiscal 1983, records check 
inspections exceeded 10,000 per year, more than one of every six OSHA in- 
spections. 
One can view the records checks as being a mechanism for obtaining current 
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abling OSHA to target its efforts better. One might, of course, modify the rec- 
ords checks approach by making the inspection exemption threshold industry 
specific. 
The adoption of records check inspections came under substantial fire by 
outside critics since the procedure completely exempted from inspection firms 
that might violate OSHA standards (see Simon 1983).  Falsification of accident 
records to obtain the exemption was also a potential problem, but no studies 
have documented any change in injury-reporting  practices. 
Had such inspections been introduced as an additional component of  the 
enforcement effort rather than as part of a general policy of reduced enforce- 
ment, they might have been better received. Since the total change in OSHA 
policies reflected a drop in the number of inspections coupled with a replace- 
ment of full-scale inspections by more cursory records check inspections, the 
overall appearance was that of diminishing the enforcement effort. 
The other component of  OSHA's  enforcement effort-penalties-had  in- 
creased gradually under the Carter administration, but penalties were still at 
very low levels. To decrease OSHA's  confrontational character, Auchter im- 
posed a dramatic reduction in penalties and, in particular, required that any 
penalty in excess of $10,000 must be formally approved by the OSHA director. 
The chilling effect of this policy is reflected in an 80 percent reduction in the 
frequency of penalties above the $10,000 threshold (see Simon 1983). Com- 
pany appeals of inspection decisions also became viewed as a negative index 
of an inspector's job performance, as the emphasis was on negotiated solutions 
rather than confrontations. 
The statistics in table 7.12 indicate the character of these changes. The early 
years of the Reagan administration marked a decline in the number of inspec- 
tions. The actual decline is ever greater since a substantial portion of  these 
inspections are records check inspections. The average safety inspection time 
dropped from sixteen hours per inspection in 1980 to ten hours per inspection 
in 1983, and the average case hours per health inspection declined from forty- 
four hours per inspection in 1980 to thirty-three hours per inspection in 1983. 
The citations issued per hour of safety and health inspections increased so that 
the productivity of these inspections per unit time rose over that period. 
The dramatic shift in the financial incentives created by OSHA is indicated 
by  the data in the final column of table 7.12. The drop in penalties began in 
fiscal year 1981, for which the Carter and Reagan administrations overlapped. 
By fiscal year 1982, total OSHA penalties had dropped to $5.6 million, a figure 
that is far less than the $80 billion in wage compensation that workers received 
in that time period for job risks (see Viscusi 1983). 
This period of deregulation subsequently gave way to a reversal in OSHA's 
emphasis. There was a resurgence in the penalty levels by  1987 and 1988, with 
considerably more penalties being levied in 1988 than in any year in OSHA's 
history. The extent of the change in enforcement stringency is borne out in the 
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Table 7.12  Summary of Federal OSHA Inspection Activity 
Inspections  Violations  Proposed Penalties 
Fiscal year  (thousands)  (thousands)  ($millions) 
No. of Penalties 
Year  above $1 Million 
1972  28.9  89.6  2.1 
1973  47.6  153.2  4.2 
1974  78.1  292.0  7.0 
1975  80.9  318.8  8.2 
1976  90.3  380.3  12.4 
1977  59.9  181.9  11.6 
1978  57.2  134.5  19.9 
1979  57.9  128.5  23.0 
1980  63.4  132.4  25.5 
1981  57.0  111.4  10.8 
1982  61.2  97.1  5.6 
1983  68.9  111.7  6.4 
1984  72.0  111.6  8.1 
1985  71.3  119.7  9.2 
1986  64.1  129.0  12.5 
1987  61.5  137.0  24.5 
1988  58.4  154.9  45.0 
Source: OSHA computer printouts and data published in U.S. Department of  Labor, Report of the 
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Source: Based on data provided in US.  Department of Labor (1990). 
million. Until 1986, OSHA had never penalized a firm by that great an amount 
on the basis of a single set of citations. However, in the late 1980s, Secretary 
of Labor Brock introduced a severe penalty structure for egregious violations. 
A substantial and increasing number of such penalties were levied, ranging as 
high as the 1989 penalty of $7.3 million against USX. This single firm’s pen- 
alty exceeded the total penalties levied for the entire country for 1982 or 1983. 
Moreover, the fines imposed by OSHA attracted widespread attention to the 
enforcement effort, altering the public’s perception of its stringency. 
Consequently, the decade of  the 1980s was one of  enforcement extremes. 
By most criteria, the enforcement effort in the early 1980s was the most lax in 
OSHA history, whereas by the end of the decade OSHA had become more 
vigorous in its enforcement than ever before. The strategy of  deregulation 
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7.7.2  The EPA Enforcement Effort 
The enforcement strategy at EPA bore some similarities to that at OSHA, 
with the principal exception being that the initial EPA head Anne Gorsuch was 
generally regarded as a poor manager (see Niskanen 1988, 128). Environmen- 
tal critics charged that Gorsuch had abandoned EPA’s  mission: “There is a 
massive regulatory resistance going on in this administration. . .  . This admin- 
istration is massively disobeying these laws because they  don’t like them. In 
this context, the only mechanism we have for enforcement is the  court^."^' 
Anne Gorsuch had shifted substantial enforcement authority to the states, 
decreasing federal technical support for the enforcement effort as well as fed- 
eral financing of it. Organizations such as the National Governor’s Association 
expressed dismay at the shift in EPA policy: “The perception within the regu- 
lating community was that there would be no enforcement. . . .  That made the 
states’ job so much harder.”32 
For the politically prominent Superfund program, Gorsuch also erred by 
appointing personnel who had no apparent regulatory commitment or exper- 
tise. Rita Lavelle’s management of the Superfund program attracted criticism 
for managerial incompetence and alleged sweetheart deals with industry. 
Gorsuch was succeeded in March 1983 by William Ruckelshaus after Gor- 
such’s highly contentious and weak performance. Ruckelshaus was the initial 
head of EPA in 1970, and his selection reflected the need to restore the credi- 
bility of the agency. The successor to Ruckelshaus, Lee Thomas, was a career 
administrator who continued the policies of Ruckelshaus. 
Table 7.14 provides a quantitative perspective on the enforcement effort by 
summarizing EPA’s  civil referrals to the U.S. Department of  Justice-EPA’s 
principal enforcement sanction. During the Gorsuch era, referrals to the Justice 
Department for violations of air and water regulation declined substantially, as 
did total referrals. Perhaps most striking was the drop in referrals for hazardous 
waste violations. Since these violations pertain to regulations that had been 
established only recently and should have been the major growth area for new 
EPA initiatives, the reversal in these referrals to less than half their level in 
1980 is a substantial departure. The hazards posed by toxins and pesticides, 
which would eventually compose an increasingly important part of the EPA’s 
agenda in the 1980s, received almost no attention whatsoever. 
The data in table 7.15 on administrative actions undertaken by EPA provide 
a similar perspective. The lowest number of  administrative actions was  in 
1982,  but by the late 1980s administrative enforcement actions had returned to 
the higher levels of the Carter administration. 
The restoration of the enforcement effort in fiscal 1984 and 1985 marks the 
3 1. This statement was made by Jonathan Lash, senior staff attorney at the Natural Resources 
32. Statement by Edward A. Helme, director of the National Governors’ Association Natural 
Defense Council (see Mosher 1981,2233). 
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Table 7.14  EPA Civil Referrals to the Department of Justice 
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Source: Based on Russell (1990,  table 7-6),  using data from Mealeyk Litigation Reports: Su- 
pefind 1,  no. 18 (28 December 1988): C-1. 
Table 7.15  EPA Administrative  Actions Initiated (by act), Fiscal Years 1972-88 
Clean Water  Resource 
and Safe  Conservation  Toxic 
Drinking  and  Superfund  Substances 
Clean Air  Water Acts  Recovery  (CERCLA)  FIFRA"  Control Act 







































































































0  860 
0  1,274 
0  1,387 
0  2,352 
0  3,613 
0  2,644 
1  1,622 
22  1,185 
101  864 
70  90  1 
101  864 
294  1,848 
376  3,124 
733  2,609 
781  2,626 
1,051  3,194 
607  3,085 
Source: Based on Russell (1990,  table 7-7).  using data from Mealeyk Litigation Reports: Su- 
perfund  1, no. 18 (28 December 1988): C-5. 
"FIFRA = Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide  Act. 496  W.  Kip Viscusi 
impact of the Ruckelshaus  reforms on EPA’s enforcement  credibility. In a Janu- 
ary speech at EPA, Ruckelshaus observed, “Unless [the states] have a gorilla in 
the closet, they can’t do the job. And the gorilla is EPA (Stanfield 1984,1034). 
The reality of  the gorilla in the closet became reflected in the actions that 
EPA  undertook.  Enforcement patterns for  particular EPA  programs  often 
changed dramatically. Under the Superfund program established in 1980, EPA 
undertook no administrative actions whatsoever before the Ruckelshaus era. In 
fiscal year  1984, the  number  of  administrative actions that  EPA  initiated 
jumped to 137 per year, climbing eventually to 224 per year (MeaZeyb Litiga- 
tion Report: Supeq%nd 1, no. 18 [28 December 19881: C-5). 
The main contribution of the Gorsuch era at the EPA was to scale back the 
enforcement effort and slow down the implementation of the newly emerging 
programs for hazardous wastes and toxic substances. The contribution of the 
Ruckelshaus and Thomas era was twofold. First, the enforcement capabilities 
of EPA were restored to their levels at the start of the decade. Second, Ruckels- 
haus and Thomas fostered the development of enforcement  efforts in the newly 
emerging areas of EPA’s agenda. 
7.8  The Impact of Regulation on Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Quality 
The ultimate objective of  social regulation policies is to influence health, 
safety, and environmental outcomes. Assessing the impact of  the regulatory 
activities of  the 1980s is not straightforward. Some of  the ultimate costs of 
these regulations have not been fully transmitted throughout the economy. This 
is particularly true for situations involving noncompliance, phased schedules 
for compliance to accommodate industries in economic hardship, and regula- 
tions promulgated in the 1980s but with increasingly stringent requirements 
being imposed over time. A second complicating factor is that regulation is 
not the only influence on safety and environmental outcomes. Safety risk levels 
of all kinds have been declining throughout the  As society has be- 
come wealthier, our preferences for safety are enhanced. Ideally, we would like 
to distinguish the effects of government regulation from the trends that would 
otherwise have taken place in the absence of regulation. 
Table 7.16 provides a summary of several death risk trends. One can view 
1970 as marking the beginning of the decade of safety and environmental regu- 
lation. All three sets of death rates in table 7.16 have been in decline since the 
1930s. The rate of  decline for work accidents was  somewhat greater in the 
1980s than in previous decades, while the rate of decline in motor vehicle 
accidents is a bit higher than in the 1970s. The 1980s rate of decline in home 
accidents, which reflects the activities of the CPSC and the FDA, was almost 
33. The only exception to this pattern is that of automobile fatalities, which are also in decline 
if one recognizes the changing age distribution and the change in the miles driven. 497  Health and Safety Regulation 
Table 7.16  Principal Death Risk Rates 
Annual Rate of  Increase in Death Rates 
Work  Home  Motor Vehicle 
1930-40  -1.8  -  .2  -3.3 
1940-50  -2.3  -2.2  -4.0 
1950-60  -2.8  -2.1  -3.5 
1960-70  -  1.2  -1.7  -.8 
1970-80  -  1.6  -2.7  -3.3 
1980-90  -3.2  -2.4  -4.3 
Source: Calculations by  the author using death rate data from National Safety Council (1988, 
Note:  All figures are given per 100,000 population. 
14-15,70-71). 
identical to that in the 1970s. Overall, death rates continued to drop in  the 
1980s at roughly the same pace as in previous decades. 
7.8.1  Job Risk Trends 
Other job risk measures suggest somewhat different risk trends. Table 7.17 
reports four different measures of  workplace risk levels that capture injuries 
other than death risks. The bottom panel of table 7.17 presents the percentage 
annual growth rates for these four different risk measures: the rates of decline 
for total injuries, lost workday injuries, nonfatal injuries without lost workdays, 
and the total rate of lost workdays. The patterns for these four measures indi- 
cate a slowing in the rate of decline or, in the case of  total lost workdays, a 
lower rate of increase. 
Since cyclical factors and other influences are at work, one needs a more 
detailed econometric analysis to isolate the independent influence of regula- 
tory policy. The findings in Viscusi (1986) for 1973-83  indicate that the effect 
of  the previous year’s OSHA inspections on injury rates in the current year 
ranges from a low value of 2.6 percent for total injury rates, to an intermediate 
value of 3.6 percent for lost workday case rates, to a high value of 6.1 percent 
for the rate of total lost workdays. Moreover, there is no evidence of a dropoff 
in the impact of these inspections on injuries with the advent of the records 
check inspections. A more detailed examination of the performance of OSHA 
records check inspections by Ruser and Smith (1988) indicates that, for plants 
potentially subject to the records check procedure, the reported injury rates 
declined by 5-14  percent. There was, however, underreporting of job injuries 
during that period.34  What we do not know is whether there was any change in 
the extent of underreporting. On balance, however, there is no evidence that 
the institution of records check inspections decreased the overall efficacy of 
the typical OSHA inspection. 
34. For a discussion of the underreporting problem, see Ruser and Smith (1988). 498  W.  Kip Viscusi 
Table 7.17  Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rates per 100 
Full-Time Workers 
Iniuries and Illnesses 
Lost  Without 
Workday  Lost  Lost 
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Source: Calculations by the author and data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989, table 6) 
and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Injuries andtllness by Industry (various years). 
Note: Data for 1976-88  exclude farms  with fewer than eleven employees. 
7.8.2  Auto Safety EffecQ 
Analysis of the impact of automobile safety regulation is also complicated 
by  the role of competing influences that affect the safety trend, such as the 
character of highway construction and the age composition of the population. 
There is substantial controversy in the literature over the effect of automobile 
safety regulations on highway accident rates because of  the possibly counter- 
productive effect of safety belt regulations on driver behavior.35  Drivers wear- 
ing safety belts faced lower expected accident costs and as a result will have a 
reduced incentive to exercise care.36  The general consensus in the literature is 
35. The initial paper in this area is that of  Peltzman (1975). For further discussion of  these 
issues and the controversy over this line of research, see Blomquist (1988). Crandall et al. (1986). 
and Graham (1989). 
36. To  obtain a status report on this debate, see Crandall et al. (1986), which advocates the 
safety-enhancing  viewpoint. For the most recent perspective  from the school of thought that places 
substantial weight on the counterproductive  impacts of safety policies, see Blomquist (1988). 499  Health and Safety Regulation 
that automobiles have become much safer for passengers, but there has been 
an apparent increase in the risk posed to pedestrians and bicyclists. The com- 
peting magnitudes of these effects has long been debated. 
The performance of  the other aspects of  automobile regulation is mixed. 
Automobile emissions standards have lowered the pollution levels for new 
cars, but the penalty levels on the cars that fail to comply with the standards 
have led motorists to keep old, high emission vehicles on the road (see Crandall 
et al. 1986). Fuel economy standards are also a binding constraint, but most 
economists would prefer market-based incentives, such as a gasoline tax, so 
that motorists can respond to the changing terms of trade rather than be con- 
strained by specific fuel economy standards on corporate fleets. 
7.8.3  Pollution Trends 
The net effect of automobile and other pollution regulations on environmen- 
tal outcomes is summarized by the pollution trends in table 7.18. The data in 
this table provide information on emissions,  which are correlated with air qual- 
ity but are not an exact measure of it. Moreover, the monitoring data involve 
substantial error, where the direction and magnitude of the error are unknown. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the table is that the wave of deregulation 
efforts and lax environmental enforcement that characterized the period 1981- 
Table 7.18  National Pollution Emissions %rids 
Pollutant (teragrams/year) 
Sulfur  Nitrogen  Carbon  Lead 
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Source: U.S. Environmental  Protection Agency (1990,2). 
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82 did not lead to a rapid deterioration of environmental quality. The improve- 
ments in environmental quality took place at a slower pace than in earlier years, 
but there is no evidence of worsening air quality for the five different measures 
of pollution listed. 
The first type of air pollution emission listed in table 7.18 is that of particu- 
lates, which arise primarily from fuel combustion (e.g., coal combustion by 
railroads), forest fires, industrial processes, and highway motor vehicles. The 
rate of decline in particulate emissions in the 1980s was 2.6 percent annually. 
This rate is much less than during the 1970s, when tremendous progress was 
made against this class of emission. 
The second type of  emission, sulphur dioxide, arises from stationary fuel 
combustion and industrial processes. The principal contributor to this type of 
pollution is fuel combustion involving sulphur-bearing coal. After an increase 
in sulphur oxides in the 1960s, there was a decline in these emissions through 
both the 1970s and the 1980s at roughly comparable rates, primarily because 
of  increased controls of  emissions by  nonferrous smelters and sulfuric acid 
plants. 
The third class of emission in table 7.18, nitrogen oxides, arises from both 
highway motor vehicles and stationary sources, such as coal-fired electric util- 
ity boilers. After an increase in these emissions during the 1960s and 1970s, 
there was a slight decline in such emissions during the  1980s. Automobile 
emissions controls are among the policies that have contributed to this trend. 
The fourth class of emission included in table 7.18 is that of carbon monox- 
ide, for which highway motor vehicle emissions are the largest contributors. 
The rate of decline in carbon monoxide emissions increased in the 1980s. 
Of the sets of  statistics in table 7.18, the lead statistics in the final column 
provide the  strongest evidence of  improvements in  environmental quality. 
These gains can also be traced to specific regulatory policies. The primary 
sources of these lead emissions are motor vehicles and industrial processes. 
The impact of  EPA's  successive reductions in the allowable lead content of 
gasoline in  1985 and 1986 was dramatic. Lead emissions were cut almost in 
half between 1984 and 1985, and between 1985 and 1986 they were reduced 
by more than half again. Within a two-year period, 80 percent of all lead emis- 
sions were eliminated. Moreover, on the basis of the OMB review of the regu- 
latory impact analysis, this environmental improvement also represents a situa- 
tion in which the benefits to society of  the improved environmental quality 
exceed the costs. This decrease in lead emissions is perhaps the major environ- 
mental success story of the 1980s. 
For other EPA  efforts that were central to the environmental policy in the 
1980s, there are no comparable measures of  environmental pollution levels, 
but there are some indices of policy achievements. 
For the Superfund program established by  legislation in 1980:'  the 1980s 
37. The statistics presented below are based on the discussion in Acton (1989), particularly the 
material in app. A. 501  Health and Safety Regulation 
marked a significant environmental cleanup effort. By  1989, EPA had identi- 
fied over 30,000 Superfund sites and had inspected almost 10,000 of them. In 
over  12,000 cases, EPA  concluded that no further action was warranted. In 
terms of actual cleanup activities, EPA had initiated removal actions in  1,347 
cases, although it has completed only a small fraction of these removal efforts. 
These removal actions pertained to 274 of the 1,063 sites that EPA put on its 
national priority list. If one views this listing as comprehensive, EPA had begun 
to address roughly one-fourth of its high-priority waste sites in the 1980s. The 
extent of  the risk that was reduced and the extent that it should have  been 
reduced given the costs and benefits of cleanup are not known. Moreover, with- 
out any comparable efforts in the 1970s, there is no good reference point for 
assessing the pace of the cleanup. 
7.9  The Regulatory Record of the 1980s 
The 1980s record in terms of influencing the structure of safety and environ- 
mental policies is very mixed. The initial efforts of the Reagan administration 
emphasized deregulation and budgetary cutbacks rather than changes in the 
structure of  regulation. This approach reflected an antiregulation approach 
rather than meaningful regulatory reform. This misplaced emphasis dissipated 
much of  the political momentum for regulatory reform at the start of  the 
Reagan administration. Because of the disappointing performance of promi- 
nent officials such as Reagan’s first head of EPA, much of the 1980s was spent 
restoring the credibility of  the agencies rather than making substantive ad- 
vances. There were also some regulatory achievements-the  phase down of 
lead in gasoline, the introduction of the OSHA hazard communication policy 
proposed by  Carter and enacted by  Reagan, and expediting the approval of 
drugs for life-threatening diseases. 
By the mid-l980s, the regulatory reform effort had ended. Vice President 
Bush terminated his Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Regulatory agencies 
proposed regulations with greater costs than ever before. OMB became less 
influential in altering the structure of regulation, and regulatory enforcement 
became more vigorous than before the onset of deregulation. 
The window of opportunity for regulatory reform was not great, and this 
opportunity had been squandered on a misguided deregulation agenda. There 
was no attempt whatsoever to address the fundamental long-term problems 
arising from agencies’ restrictive legislative mandates. At a more modest level, 
there was not even a broad-based effort to adopt market-based approaches to 
controlling risk or to emphasize more performance-oriented regulations. By 
the mid-l980s, regulatory policy returned to the same patterns as in earlier 
administrations, except that OMB appears to have had some limited influence 
in eliminating some of the most inefficient regulations. 
In  effect, there were two Reagan  regulation  agendas-the  deregulation 
agenda that pertained from 1981 to 1983 and the return to the traditional regu- 
latory agenda from 1984 to 1989. The Bush administration has continued the 502  W.  Kip Viscusi 
policies of  the second Reagan agenda. In retrospect, the deregulation efforts 
will be viewed as a temporary policy aberration rather than as an effort with 
any lasting impact. 
The extent to which this record should be viewed negatively depends in 
large part on the reference point used for the assessment. Advocates of mean- 
ingful regulatory reform will be disappointed in this performance because of 
the forgone opportunity for fundamental change. The widespread consensus 
on the direction for reform reflected in the economics literature contrasts with 
the very mixed nature of the reform efforts. The impetus for meaningful regu- 
latory reform and effective oversight appears to have been lost, as the task of 
undertaking the unfulfilled risk and environmental agenda of  the 1980s had 
taken precedence. 
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2.  Christopher DeMuth 
As Kip Viscusi stated in his fine paper, the primary goal of the Reagan admin- 
istration in the area of regulation was to improve the efficiency of regulatory 
programs by hewing to economic thinking as much as possible. Thus, this area 505  Health and Safety Regulation 
of economic policy provides a good occasion to address the questions with 
which Martin Feldstein opened this conference, namely, Where was economic 
thinking influential in policy-making, Where was it not, and, Why? 
Let me begin by  mentioning three reasons why  regulatory policy repre- 
sented a fruitful area in which to increase the role of economic reasoning in 
policy-making. First, the regulatory agencies have an enormous amount of dis- 
cretion in interpreting the laws, despite a common belief that statutory stan- 
dards are very strict (and often so uneconomic as to make almost any econo- 
mist shrink in horror). In truth, the agencies are usually told in general terms 
to promote occupational safety, or pollution reduction, or whatever, and are 
then given great discretion in how they do so through particular regulations. 
Second, as a sort of constitutional price for this discretion, regulatory agen- 
cies are required to be highly, and I think almost uniquely, rationalistic about 
what they do. They must give public notice about their intended policies and 
draw a coherent connection between those policies and their legislated objec- 
tives. Further, both the agencies’ decisions and the rationales that they offer 
for those decisions are subject to some degree of review by the courts. Clearly, 
rule making can be a contentious and politicized process, and the rationales 
that the agencies give may disguise narrower or unworthy goals, but, neverthe- 
less, there is an obligation to justify what is being done in regulatory policy 
that is greater than that for monetary or fiscal policy. 
Third, a series of executive orders beginning in the Nixon administration 
has created a progressively more aggressive and formal review of regulatory 
policy by  the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) and other White 
House offices. Although these orders began with rather vague and ad hoc stan- 
dards-“quality  of life” in the Nixon administration and “inflation impact” in 
the Ford administration-they  have been expressed increasingly in economic 
or at least cost-benefit terms. That progression culminated in an executive or- 
der signed by President Reagan shortly after he came into office that set forth 
a series of net social benefit standards that are reported below in section A of 
the appendix. 
Many  of  the people  supporting regulatory reform, including many  col- 
leagues and allies around this table, had academic backgrounds and were very 
sympathetic to the notion of using economics in regulatory policy. During the 
time  that  I  administered President Reagan’s  regulatory review  program at 
OMB, roughly sixty regulations came in for review every week, and I think 
that everyone there tried to push the economic standard as thoroughly as pos- 
sible in that review process. Indeed, I tried to some extent to codify our ap- 
proach to regulation through a kind of  common law of review of  individual 
rules. By applying economics to a variety of types of regulatory action, I tried 
to give the agencies and the outside world a sense of how we interpreted and 
were applying the executive order. Eventually, a set of regulatory policy guide- 
lines was established in another executive order; they are reported below in 
section B of  the appendix. Someone recently described these guidelines as 506  Christopher DeMuth 
the most relentless application of microeconomic theory to regulatory policy 
ever attempted. 
In the rest of these remarks, I want to discuss the extent to which we suc- 
ceeded or failed in our attempt to push economic thinking. I think that the best 
framework for this discussion is to consider three types or classes of regulatory 
policy where the executive branch has broad legal discretion. In the first case, 
corresponding to guideline 2 in section B of the appendix, economics provides 
a clear prior indication of what the right policy is. The second situation is at 
the other extreme, where determining the correct policy is not a matter of the- 
ory but requires a lot of empirical work as well; this situation corresponds to 
guideline 4 in section B. The third situation is an intermediate  one, correspond- 
ing to guideline 3 in Section B. My conclusion will be that the attempt to apply 
economic thinking in the regulatory review process was most successful where 
the policy implications of economic analysis were most widely understood and 
accepted by  policy officials who were not themselves economists-in  other 
words, where economic thinking had already suffused the thinking of regula- 
tors who were not professional economists. 
The first class of regulation that I want to consider is agricultural marketing 
orders, which might involve removing 25 percent of the almonds from the mar- 
ket for the coming year or denying certain people the permission to plant hops 
on their underutilized cropland. Many people at the White House had thought 
that the executive order on regulation would affect primarily the regulation of 
transportation, occupational health and safety, and the environment and were 
surprised to discover a spate of these egregious agricultural marketing orders 
coming in for review. In some ways, I wished that I could ignore these orders 
because, although they were offensive, I suspected that their economic impact 
was not nearly as great as the impact of the health, safety, and environmental 
regulations. At the same time, many people outside the administration  believed 
that the executive order on regulation was simply a way to provide relief for 
industry rather than sound economic policy. So, in that situation, we simply 
could not ignore these marketing orders. 
The analysts at the Agriculture Department were shocked when I told them 
that I did not even want to see their cost-benefit analyses demonstrating the 
marketing orders to be beneficial. I knew without looking at the facts that the 
rules could not be beneficial, that price controls and entry controls in  thor- 
oughly competitive markets were empirically uninteresting. I started rejecting 
these rules left and right, including one Michigan cheny order the rejection of 
which put an end to any prospects that Dave Stockman  had for a future political 
career, for which he has been, I hope, deeply grateful to me. 
Dealing with these marketing orders absorbed a lot of time and attention, 
and, as Bill Niskanen pointed out, eventually there was an appropriations  rider 
that prevented OMB from reviewing the orders in the future. As I look back 
on this issue, however, I am surprised at how much change we were able to 
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of  the benefits of  these orders. We  abolished the two marketing orders that 
contained outright entry controls; we greatly reduced the use of “set asides” in 
a variety of other orders; and for the two  largest and most harmful marketing 
orders, affecting California citrus crops, we greatly truncated the growing sea- 
son to which the orders applied and allowed free marketing at the beginning 
and the end. Further, the people in the Agricultural Marketing Service gradu- 
ally assimilated an economic way  of  thinking about the effects of entry and 
price controls. Thus, although we had no allies in the beginning, by the end it 
did not even matter very much when Congress passed the appropriations  rider. 
My understanding is that these agricultural marketing orders are continuing to 
come unraveled, and I think that eventually they will fade away. 
The second class of  regulation deals with environmental protection. This 
regulation applies to situations where there are no markets, where there are 
large externalities, and where regulation is clearly justified. But, in contrast 
with the agricultural marketing orders, there is nothing in economic theory to 
decide what the appropriate extent of that regulation should be. Let me focus 
on the example of effluent guidelines under the Clean Water Act, where the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets industry-by-industry standards 
for the amounts of various sorts of pollutants that can be discharged. This is 
an area of regulation where the use of cost-benefit analysis  itself was not partic- 
ularly controversial-we  were not arguing that economics says you  cannot 
control water pollution, and almost everybody at EPA acknowledged that cost- 
benefit analysis was an appropriate way  to gauge pollution control measure. 
Significant controversies arose in  the application  of  cost-benefit analysis, 
however. 
To start, it was difficult to measure the benefits of reducing water pollution. 
We  usually had a pretty good estimate of the costs of reducing pollution, but 
many of the benefits were recreational or aesthetic, which are very hard to 
measure or assess in any quantitative way. We  noticed, however, that the efflu- 
ent guidelines produced enormous discrepancies across industries in the per- 
unit cost of reducing pollution. EPA had developed a fairly helpful metric for 
comparing the pollution effects of  different kinds of  discharge, so we could 
calculate the cost per pound of reduction of this average pollution equivalent. 
What we found were differences across industries that were often of several 
orders of magnitude! Clearly, although we might have disagreed about exactly 
what the benefits of pollution reduction were, all those rules could not be cor- 
rect. Some rules must be too costly, or some must not be costly enough. 
It turned out that the explanation for these massive discrepancies was that 
many people at EPA believed that cost-benefit analysis meant financial analy- 
sis. That is, they would impose a much tougher standard on a particular indus- 
try if it were much more profitable than other industries. Their idea of cost- 
benefit analysis was to turn the screws on  the pulp and paper industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry, and other highly profitable industries and to ease way 
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ies. This astounded us because it fit so neatly into many political economy 
theories of rent seeking and regulation. In fact, I believe that it has provided 
fodder for some subsequent academic articles. 
As I look back on this class of  regulations, I believe that we made very 
substantial headway in increasing the role of economics in policy-making. 
First, the range of pollution reduction costs in the effluent guidelines was much 
narrower at the end of the Reagan administration than at the beginning. Sec- 
ond, the people who were working on these matters at EPA came to take a very 
different approach toward effluent guidelines. Finally, the administration made 
similar progress in other areas of regulation involving health risks. When one 
rule imposed a cost of $900,000 at the margin per life saved and the next rule 
imposed a cost of $245 million at the margin per life saved, there was a prob- 
lem. At $245 million we were clearly well above what anybody in the United 
States would ever spend for risk avoidance in their private lives. So we were 
able to eliminate a lot of  harmful regulations at the top while maintaining a 
good deal of disagreement on what the appropriate level of  spending should 
be lower down. In particular, I think we did a good job at putting an end to a 
large number of  extraordinarily harmful and silly regulations in the area of 
hazardous air pollutants. 
I want to mention also the lead phase-down regulation, which was a substan- 
tial victory for economic analysis and a case where OMB and the White House 
were reversed rather than EPA. One of our early targets for elimination was 
the lead phase-down regulation, which required that lead be removed from 
gasoline refining at a faster rate than would be dictated by the phasing in of new 
cars that required no-lead gasoline. A very fine piece of  analysis persuaded 
everyone that the health harms of leaded gasoline were far greater than we had 
thought, and we ended up adopting a much tighter program than the one we 
had inherited. At the same time, the introduction of marketable lead permits 
saved many hundreds of millions of dollars from the cost of that regulation. 
The third class of regulation that I want to address represents an intermediate 
case between price and entry controls, on the one hand, and externality regula- 
tion, on the other. The case that I have in mind is product standardization, 
which may be a component of health and safety regulation but often concerns 
a normal economic good. In particular, it often pertains to a new good or an 
innovation in an older good that somebody wants to have adopted uniformly. 
This is the area of regulation where cost-benefit analysis is the most prob- 
lematic in my view. Consider an innovation that increases people’s safety. It is 
easy to assume a certain level of  effectiveness for this innovation and show 
that it would be cost beneficial to make every product conform to this new 
standard. But such an analysis ignores the fact that the optimal rate of diffusion 
of a new technology is not instantaneous but involves a learning process. Some 
individuals will gain more from this innovation than other people, and they 
will purchase the innovation at the price at which it will initially come on the 
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much more, in terms of both quality and price, than if  a government rule had 
universalized the initial innovation. 
Consider the issue of passive restraints, which is bureaucratic argot for air- 
bags in cars. When I was in the administration, economist Bill Nordhaus pre- 
sented a very persuasive cost-benefit analysis showing that the airbag rule sup- 
ported by the insurance companies would have substantial positive net benefits. 
This did not surprise me, but it did not show that it was desirable for the gov- 
ernment to impose this technology on all consumers at once. I argued at the 
time that the most effective national airbag rule, in terms of promoting automo- 
bile passenger safety, would be a constitutional amendment forbidding the fed- 
eral government from making any rule having to do with airbags. My rationale 
was simply that airbags were a normal economic good with which we had very 
little practical experience. If  the government made no rule about airbags, it 
seemed clear to me that they would be introduced and would diffuse through 
the market in about the way  that car radios or sunroofs did. I never doubted 
that an affluent couple living in downtown Boston with three teenage sons 
would be foolish not to purchase a car with an airbag at the initial design and 
price or that  a thirty-five-year-old single woman who always fastened her 
three-point seatbelt, had a modest income, and lived in a rural part of Kansas 
would be foolish to purchase an airbag at the price at which it would first 
appear on the market. In fact, if one looks at the history of automobile manu- 
facturers’ experiments with airbags, there is a good deal of evidence that they 
were seriously interested in the technology at an early stage. They turned away 
from airbags only when it became clear that, if this were a promising technol- 
ogy, they would be forced to install it instantly on every new car they sold. 
Yet these arguments, which seemed highly persuasive to me and to the econ- 
omists I was working with at OMB, seemed strange and irrelevant not only to 
program officials at the Transportation Department but also to political offi- 
cials at the White House. They never became part of the administration’s  public 
argument in the airbag controversy, and we eventually issued a complex rule 
that phased in airbags according to the pace of state legislation requiring the 
use of seat belts. And, as a general matter, I discovered that the executive order 
had much less practical effect in the intermediate case of product standardiza- 
tion than in the polar cases of price and entry controls and pollution controls. 
Although it would be academically fashionable to attribute this difference 
to the large rents to be obtained by producer groups from product standardiza- 
tion, my  casual impression is that the extent of  political pressure brought to 
bear in this class of regulations was not much different than in the agricultural 
marketing orders and the EPA pollution controls. Instead, I attribute the differ- 
ence to differences in the diffusion of economic thinking. The harms of gov- 
ernment price and entry controls are widely understood and accepted and are 
bolstered by popular tales of farmers denied permission to farm their own land 
and of oranges left to rot in the fields. The notions of cost effectiveness and of 
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also easy for noneconomists to grasp and apply. But the idea that the govern- 
ment should refrain from standardizing a product or a production process in a 
way that is abstractly “good” is more complicated-accepting  it requires not 
only particular facts (as in the case of pollution controls) but also assumptions 
about the operation of private markets that laymen are often less willing to 
make than economists. It is an interesting puzzle that economists have been 
much more successful in persuading others of the evils of price fixing than of 
the evils of quality fixing. 
Appendix 
A. Regulatory Principles 
Executive Order 12291 provides in section 2 that, “to the extent permitted 
by law, 
(a)  Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information con- 
cerning the need for and consequences of proposed government action; 
(b)  Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society; 
(c)  Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to so- 
ciety; 
(d)  Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the al- 
ternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and 
(e)  Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the 
aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the 
particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national 
economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future.” 
B .  Regulatory Policy Guidelines 
Section 1 of Executive Order 12498 reaffirmed the following guidelines for 
rulemaking agencies originally set forth in 1983: 
1. Regulations should be issued only on evidence that their potential bene- 
fits exceed their potential costs. Regulatory objectives, and the methods for 
achieving these objectives, should be chosen to maximize the net benefits to 
society. 
2.  Regulation of  prices and production in competitive markets should be 
avoided. Entry into private markets should be regulated only where necessary 
to protect health or safety or to manage public resources efficiently. 
3.  Federal regulations should not prescribe uniform quality standards for 
private goods or services, except where these products are needlessly unsafe 
or product variations are wasteful, and voluntary private standards have failed 
to correct the problem. 511  Health and Safety Regulation 
4.  Regulations that seek to reduce health or safety risks should be based 
upon scientific risk-assessment procedures, and should address risks that are 
real and significant rather than hypothetical or remote. 
5. Health, safety, and environmental regulations should address ends rather 
than means. 
6. Licensing and permitting decisions and reviews of new products should 
be made swiftly and should be based on standards that are clearly defined in 
advance. 
7. Qualifications for receiving government licenses should be the minimum 
necessary. Where there are more qualified applicants than available licenses, 
the licenses should be allocated by  auction or random lottery rather than by 
administrative procedures. 
8. Where regulations create private rights or obligations, unrestricted ex- 
change of these rights or obligations should be encouraged. 
9. Federal regulations should not preempt State laws or regulations, except 
to guarantee rights of national citizenship or to avoid significant burdens on 
interstate commerce. 
10. Regulations establishing terms or conditions of  Federal grants, con- 
tracts, or financial assistance should be limited to the minimum necessary to 
achieving the purposes for which the funds were authorized and appropriated.” 
C.  Sources 
The text of Executive Order 12291 is taken from Regulatory Program of  the 
United States Government (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the Presi- 
dent, Office of Management and Budget, March 1986), xiii. The “Regulatory 
Policy Guidelines” were first set forth and elaborated in Reagan Administra- 
tion Regulatory Achievements (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Presiden- 
tial Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 11 August 1983). Executive Order 12291 
was issued on  17  February  1981  and Executive Order  12498 on 4 January 
1985. 
3. James Burnley 
When I arrived at the U.S. Department of Transportation from elsewhere in the 
Reagan administration  in early 1983, first to be general counsel and then, after 
a few months, deputy secretary, 1 did not come in with a well-formulated no- 
tion of how the regulatory processes of the department should be administered. 
I certainly shared the basic impulse of the administration  that we needed both 
regulatory reform and regulatory relief, but I had not been required by  my 
previous government responsibilities to consider regulatory issues beyond this 
elementary level. I found that the department faced quite a few regulatory is- 512  James Burnley 
sues that had to be addressed forthwith, in both macro and micro terms. Thus, 
some major catching up had to occur immediately in my  own analytic pro- 
cesses. 
What we were in fact doing in the 1980s in the transportation area was con- 
solidating economic deregulation since we came into office following a liberal 
Democratic administration that had nonetheless been successful in economic 
deregulation of  most modes of transportation. All that we had left to attempt 
to deregulate were the interstate bus industry and the maritime industry. Dereg- 
ulation of  the trucking industry needed-and  still needs-to  be completed. 
But it quickly became apparent that, whether you are in a consolidation process 
or whether you  wish, for example, to extend deregulation by  sunsetting the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which is a wonderful idea, the best 
way to undercut efforts to move toward a completely free market system is to 
be insensitive to the clear differences that exist between economic regulatory 
activities and safety regulatory activities. 
Let me hasten to observe that there is a massive gray area in the middle. 
However, when it comes to purely economic regulatory activity, such as what 
the fare shall be when you fly between Washington and New York, there really 
is no safety dimension to that decision-making process. If  you believe in free 
markets, you can quickly conclude that the government should not be in that 
business. 
If, on the other hand, you are insensitive to this distinction or, worse still, 
consciously believe that the government should not regulate the maintenance 
of commercial aircraft and that you can leave that to the marketplace, then you 
will very quickly find that your agenda on economic regulatory issues is caught 
in a tremendous backwash. Again I emphasize that there is a massive gray area. 
I am describing two ends of a spectrum, and there are numerous decisions that 
do not lend themselves to a neat dichotomy. 
Thus, when we talk about whether the Reagan administration should have 
gone further in a particular instance to deregulate a particular facet of transpor- 
tation, I would suggest that the discussion must occur within the proper con- 
text. It should begin by considering the impact of  a given regulatory decision 
on safety and the extent to which safety can be preserved or enhanced while 
deregulating economic activity. In many instances, aggressive safety regulation 
is a prerequisite to progress on economic deregulation. Understanding that 
there is a relation is critical if you wish to have the spiral that Elizabeth Bailey 
alluded to instead of having a pendulum that swings first one way and then the 
other on economic regulatory matters. 
Second, we learned that, in addition to the need to be vigorous in safety- 
related rule-making activities, economic deregulation can be undermined by 
the perception of  lax enforcement. Let me be very specific about that. The 
Reagan administration’s first Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adminis- 
trator, a very able man with many years of  experience in aviation, sincerely 
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25  percent  fewer safety inspectors than were employed the  day  President 
Reagan was sworn in. Now,  you may argue endlessly about whether he was 
right or wrong in that judgment. However, soon after joining the Treasury De- 
partment, I did conclude and, more important, Secretary Elizabeth Dole also 
concluded and persuaded OMB Director David Stockman that, on the whole, 
we were going to have a tougher time defending and perhaps even someday 
extending aviation economic deregulation if we continued down a path of ever 
fewer safety inspectors. 
There are many issues that lend themselves very  neatly to a cost-benefit 
analysis. However, I would suggest that another lesson to be learned from the 
1980s, at least at the Department of Transportation (DOT), is that, if you let 
cost-benefit analyses drive all regulatory decision making, you will sometimes 
get outcomes that trample other equally important values. For example, it can- 
not be the case for the true Reaganite that federalism is an empty concept. In 
fact, President Reagan signed an executive order on federalism late in his sec- 
ond term that required agencies explicitly to take into account the impact on 
federavstate relations of each new regulatory proposal. 
Yet, if you wish significantly to expand the capacity of the aviation system 
in this country virtually overnight, there is a neat, simple way  to do it. You 
could preempt all local decision making on airport noise issues-an  idea that 
has great appeal in many aviation circles. And, if you did a cost-benefit analysis 
of  absolute preemption of  all local decision making, I have a high level of 
confidence that the economic benefits would be calculated to greatly outweigh 
the costs. However. if cost-benefit analysis is conducted in a vacuum, there are 
other equally important values, in this case the right to recognize at least some 
local decision-making role, that will get lost. Therefore, even while assuring 
that  benefits  outweigh costs  for  each  rule  making,  other  values  must  be 
weighed as well. 
We also learned that, if you are to be successful in deregulating administra- 
tively, it is terribly important that you work hard at it and that you do it well. 
Perhaps the premier example is found in the regulatory war over passive re- 
straints in automobiles. Now, I do not mean to criticize those who went before 
me at DOT, but it was my judgment-and  I think that it was a judgment that 
Chris DeMuth shared, and it certainly was a judgment that all nine members 
of the U.S. Supreme Court shared-that  the decision made at the beginning of 
the Reagan administration to rescind  the regulations requiring passive  re- 
straints (automatic seat belts or air bags in cars) was not as well justified as it 
could have been. And, while there was a five to four decision of the Supreme 
Court as to some aspects of  that rescission, all nine justices did agree that 
there were certain very important issues that simply had not been properly or 
fully analyzed. 
The result of that Supreme Court decision in 1983 was that we had to revisit 
the issue, and we were extremely constrained by the Court’s specific guidance 
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us some discretion, it went so far as to cite in a footnote its own understanding 
of the cost-benefit ratio on 1980 Chevettes. This was based on National High- 
way  Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) figures, but the Court chose to 
send us a clear signal. It noted that NHTSA had found that, with these auto- 
matic detachable seat belts, there was 70 percent usage in 1980  Chevettes com- 
pared to 3  1 percent usage for manual seat belts in such cars. It was clear that 
we  would have to carry a very heavy burden of  proof if  we decided not to 
require passive restraint systems. 
There were clearly missed opportunities for further economic deregulation, 
in the sense that there is always more that could have been done. However, I 
believe that, at least in transportation,  the Reagan administration  does not need 
to apologize. As I noted at the outset, we were in a period of consolidation. 
For example, in 1978,  Congress passed legislation to sunset the Civil Aeronau- 
tics Board (CAB). A successor act was passed in  1984 that included much 
more specific instructions about how the CAB was to go out of business. One 
of the issues that, believe it or not, senior DOT officials had to spend a lot of 
time on was whether the residual functions of the CAB being transferred to 
the department would be spread out among existing offices of DOT or be han- 
dled by  a little CAB within the department, staffed by  that agency’s remain- 
ing employees. The latter approach would have  simply changed the CAB’S 
address on the bureaucratic plan of organization of the U.S. government. It 
would have been an arm  of  the department, like the FAA or the U.S.  Coast 
Guard. 
Now,  this may appear to be a fairly easy decision. However, the Reagan 
appointee who was chairman of the CAB believed very, very strongly that it 
should move intact to DOT and that it should open up for business the next 
day just like the day before. He lobbied Congress aggressively, despite signals 
from the White House to the contrary. Thus, we had to put a lot of time and 
energy into defending the idea that the sunset of an agency ought to mean that 
it ceases to exist. 
I would suggest to you that, while, on the one hand, it may seem the sort of 
issue that does not drive this country in one fundamental direction or another, 
it had perhaps more significance  than even we realized at the time. In the sum- 
mer of 1987, we had one of the periodic waves of hysteria concerning aviation 
safety that seems to sweep over this country every few years. This occurs re- 
gardless of whether the economics of aviation are regulated or deregulated and 
regardless of the actual safety record of commercial aviation. When that wave 
hit in 1987, had the CAB been intact and performing its residual functions as 
an identifiable entity within the Department, it would have been far easier for 
those in Congress who wished to reregulate the economics of the industry to 
have done so. All that would have been required was legislation to put the same 
people back in charge of economic regulation who were in charge of it before. 
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both the people and the residual functions were dispersed and fragmented 
among our various existing offices, there was no agency “in waiting” for resto- 
ration to its former “glory.” 
So I would suggest to you that, in looking both at what we did and at how 
best to reduce economic regulatory activities in the future, there are a number 
of  contexts that are relevant. Economic regulatory issues cannot be intelli- 
gently discussed in isolation. You cannot, for example, discuss the extraordi- 
narily good idea of  privatizing the air traffic control system (an idea, by the 
way, that the airline industry has now embraced in large measure) without ex- 
tensive consideration of actual and perceived safety effects. You cannot escape 
the interrelation between what people who fly on aircraft, or who drive the 
interstates beside big trucks, feel in their guts about the safety of those activi- 
ties and how this country ultimately will come out on economic deregulation 
of those industries. It is terribly important to keep in mind at all times that they 
are inextricably intertwined. 
Summary of Discussion 
Murray Weidenbaum began the discussion by  expressing his agreement with 
much of what the panelists had said. He believed that Secretary  James Watt and 
Ann Gorsuch at the Interior Department had initiated the regulatory backlash 
because Gorsuch thought that  she could  undo  regulations  without going 
through the legal system. In the end, regulatory reform was a considerable 
disappointment, although cost-benefit analysis did become institutionalized at 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as the reformers had wanted. 
Kip Viscusi commented that there is a strong consensus in the academic 
literature regarding health and safety regulation and that this consensus was 
reflected in the appointments to the Council of  Economic Advisers and the 
OMB. But some actions, like the appointment of  Ann Gorsuch, reflected a 
confusion between regulatory reform and deregulation;  these actions were mo- 
tivated by  a nonacademic agenda and were not consistent with any branch of 
the economics literature. Viscusi also noted that, because economists possess 
a very clear vision of what ought to be done in this area of policy, they tend to 
give any results that are achieved lower marks than they deserve. 
Robert Litan argued that the Reagan administration  had made a big mistake 
in choosing the airbag rule to rescind first. There had been tension at the begin- 
ning of the administration between the people who wanted regulatory relief 
and the people who wanted cost reform and the institutionalization of cost- 
benefit analysis. The repeal of  the airbag rule fueled the fears of those who 
thought that cost-benefit analysis would be applied everywhere merely for the 
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policy issues, such as tradable emission rights, for which one can clearly dem- 
onstrate the preservation of a certain level of benefits at reduced cost. Opening 
with the passive restraint rule aroused unnecessary opposition and poisoned 
the waters. 
William Poole raised the question of  how economists can more effectively 
make their case for policy changes in a regulatory arena heavily influenced by 
public  pressure  groups  who  are  aggressively  unreceptive  to  cost-based 
analysis. 
Phillip Areeda echoed Poole’s curiosity about why what economists know 
so clearly is ignored by Congress and special interest pressure groups. When 
Congress legislates that cost cannot play a role in certain regulatory decisions, 
something very strange is going on. The explanation must be one of two things. 
Possibly the authors of  such legislation are absolutists and believe that life, 
clean water, or whatever must be protected with no regard for the costs. This 
is unlikely. Their theory, instead, appears to be that they need to push their case 
in an exaggerated fashion in order to get even slight movement in the direction 
they want. The result is bad legislation and regulation. 
Christopher DeMuth pointed out that no one individual had made the deci- 
sion criticized by Litan, the decision to pursue the issue of airbags prior to that 
of marketable pollution permits. An administration is a group of disagreeing, 
contentious people with their own agendas, and this sequence of actions just 
happened that way. Further, the administration had taken several actions prior 
to the airbag decision that were part of  an economically consistent program. 
These actions involved removing bad regulations regardless of the size of the 
business constituency involved. 
Returning to Areeda’s and Poole’s questions, DeMuth argued that the poli- 
tics of environmentalism is radically different from that of consumerism and 
product safety. Areeda’s explanation gets at part of the problem, but another 
part is that an important goal of many environmental and consumer groups is 
to promote membership. When these groups are impervious to economic logic 
that demonstrates that the policy they favor is not going to promote consumer 
welfare or occupational safety or environmental quality, it is because they do 
not particularly care about these goals. Their extreme positions promote their 
own institutional maintenance and enhancement needs. Twenty years ago they 
might have felt the need to take extreme positions as a bargaining tactic with 
more powerful business interests, but, given their relative strength compared 
to regulated businesses today, this no longer seems necessary. 
David Stockman claimed responsibility for making the airbag regulation a 
high priority in February 1981. He repeated his earlier observation that the 
Reagan administration believed that economic regulation was wrong as a mat- 
ter of first principles, and this rule was selected because it was highly illustra- 
tive of that point. Consequently, on its first day in office, the administration 
rescinded oil price controls and announced that it would rescind the airbag 
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third parties-it  merely dictated that it would be good for the American public 
if  they were to spend $800 per car for a feature that saved lives at a cost of 
$300,000 per life. The regulatory agenda was to  get such “fundamentally 
wrong” items off the table first so that the focus could be turned to legitimate 
externalities that were in need of better decision-making mechanisms. 
William Niskanen agreed with Stockman’s reason for making the airbag reg- 
ulation a high-priority issue. He felt, however, that the administration did not 
follow through on making the distinction between measures that affect only 
one’s own safety and measures that affect the safety of others. The government 
has not accepted this distinction, as applied to smoking, internal car measures, 
or anything else. Since that principle was not applied, the airbag decision was 
made, ultimately, on a cost-benefit basis and not on a matter of principles. The 
first principle that Stockman cited has not, in fact, stuck. 
As for the future, Niskanen did not expect much reregulation of areas that 
have  been successfully deregulated. The only area in which there has been 
significant reregulation is in the asset portfolios of banks; this was a mistake, 
but an understandable mistake given the collapse of the insurance funds. There 
is some threat of reregulation in railroads and airlines, but he did not expect 
this to matter very much. On the other hand, Niskanen did expect a regulatory 
explosion in the 1990s in two new areas. First is the environment, where the 
Clean Air Act alone may cost $40 billion per year, and many other things, like 
Big Green, will play important roles as well. The second area is mandated 
benefits, where mandated medical insurance may  cost another $40 billion a 
year. One major benefit was passed in 1990, and several others are in the works. 
Niskanen believed that these areas will see new and extended forms of regula- 
tion that will be quite costly in the 1990s. This Page Intentionally Left Blank